Response to Flood protection system on track, on budget: A letter to the editor from Karen Durham-Aguilera, P.E.
Senior Executive Service, Director
Task Force Hope
Mississippi Valley Division
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/09/flood_protection_system_on_tra.html
Posted September 23, 2010, 1:05AM
As a Professional Engineer committed to holding safety paramount, Ms Durham-Aguilera should feel embarrassed to stoop to snake oil hucksterism when she asserts that New Orleans has the "best perimeter defense in its history." What New Orleans deserves is an adequate flood protection system.
Ms Durham-Aguilera is 100% correct when she cites the IPET's findings that Katrina taught us that flood risk reduction can only be accomplished as a system. Unfortunately, the Corps is still mired in fragmented projects, non-existent systems engineering practices, dysfunctional relations with local and state partners and an utter lack of effective, actionable communications with resident stakeholders about their residual risks.
The Corps is not expected to own these levees forever but is expected to provide the leadership to forge responsible local life cycle operation and maintenance. There are many institutions (none of them in Louisiana) that can help the Corps with proven practices to envision, define, architect, engineer and build integrated, resilient systems that deliver adequate safety to our residents against storms and hurricanes.
Without a midcourse correction, the findings and recommendations of the distinguished IPET report will go unheeded and unmet.
Its ironic to note that the Editors add Flood Protection System to the title when the Corps only refers to a risk reduction system. There's a huge difference.
Thursday, September 23, 2010
Thursday, September 16, 2010
Re: Don't stall on ending drilling moratorium: An editorial
In response to a Times-Picayune editorial on 16 September 2010
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/09/dont_stall_on_ending_drilling.html
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The deep water drilling moratorium was and continues to be a prudent policy that puts safety before growth. The rationale is that we don't know what happened and we don't know what responsible measures to take to prevent it from happening again. We need to wait until we see good science and engineering solutions to making offshore drilling as resilient as it needs to be.
Recent articles by your reporter David Hammer, which cite the continued lack of a safety culture have highlighted the profound uncertainty surrounding a conservative, well-engineered solution. Remember what should be the creed of all engineers - err on the side of safety when there are significant safety and uncertainty issues.
Although I have the profoundest respect for Dr Bea and his study team, I believe his recommendations of primarily fixing specific hardware problems is much to narrow and is the prevailing wisdom of today's petroleum engineers. The right line of inquiry should follow the Corp's IPET findings that pre-Katrina works were a system "in name only" and their recommendation that these works must become a true, comprehensive, integrated, holistic and resilient system in order to guard against inevitable future threats.
I firmly believe that if BP and its subs were put to the system-in-more-than-just-name test, conducted by people who have engineered proven resilient systems, they would be found wanting. Until we get the right people asking the right safety-critical questions we should continue to limit drilling in those conditions where there are no uncertainties.
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/09/dont_stall_on_ending_drilling.html
-
The deep water drilling moratorium was and continues to be a prudent policy that puts safety before growth. The rationale is that we don't know what happened and we don't know what responsible measures to take to prevent it from happening again. We need to wait until we see good science and engineering solutions to making offshore drilling as resilient as it needs to be.
Recent articles by your reporter David Hammer, which cite the continued lack of a safety culture have highlighted the profound uncertainty surrounding a conservative, well-engineered solution. Remember what should be the creed of all engineers - err on the side of safety when there are significant safety and uncertainty issues.
Although I have the profoundest respect for Dr Bea and his study team, I believe his recommendations of primarily fixing specific hardware problems is much to narrow and is the prevailing wisdom of today's petroleum engineers. The right line of inquiry should follow the Corp's IPET findings that pre-Katrina works were a system "in name only" and their recommendation that these works must become a true, comprehensive, integrated, holistic and resilient system in order to guard against inevitable future threats.
I firmly believe that if BP and its subs were put to the system-in-more-than-just-name test, conducted by people who have engineered proven resilient systems, they would be found wanting. Until we get the right people asking the right safety-critical questions we should continue to limit drilling in those conditions where there are no uncertainties.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
The Way Forward for a Systems Approach
Some follow-on thoughts on advancing resilience engineering to solve problems such as flood-induced catastrophes
Background:
Katrina devastated homes, business and lives to a historic and unprecedented (black swan) extent
Corps evaluation team (finds) that flood works were a system in name only and recommends future be approached as comprehensive systems
Corp implements a 12 action effort headed by a systems approach
12 actions turns into a campaign plan which expunges the word and intent of a systems approach
Recovery actions by Corps follow same old fragmentation by project funding with no visible integration efforts. Also appear to omit stakeholder focus and life cycle risk management
Corps adopts Adaptive Management practices from ecology community to achieve the effect of comprehensive systems - safety and resilience are not central. Corps (and state) claim they follow all system practices with no validation and evidence
Recommendations
Other distinguished organizations continue to advocate a national commission such as was used for 9/11. It hasn't happened and probably won't and certainly won't get combined with Deepwater Horizon spill although both were (probably) caused by systems in name only conditions.
I suggest demanding the Corps perform an in flight, world class peer review to asses if the the solution emerging from the Corps' recovery work, is a system in more than just name. The peer review should confirm the correctness of and adherence to the IPET's assessment and the result 12 action for change created by the Corps. The peer review would report both its findings and recommendations for doing the right thing the right way.
The peer review team should include the views from proven water safety programs such as Holland and Germany. The review team should also include relevant disciplines include systems engineering and resilience engineering rather than just narrowly focused civil engineers and hydrologists. The review team should also include members of key stakeholder classes such as residents as well as local, state and federal preparedness, response and recovery.
The scope of the peer review should address a total water safety perspective including the full range of non-structural measures
Adaptive Management includes some best practices such as experimentation but I see as omitting some of the key best practices to insure that the deliver results are and remain a resilient system. Ecosystem-oriented methods don't have an adequate focus on the criticality of human life.
The literature on resilient systems is adequate to establish a baseline "checklist" to begin assessing safety-critial systems capabillity. The peer review team would be expected to make significant contributions to sustaining more resilient public infrastructure.
The peer review might be expected to find and address some serious clashes between science and politics in the water safety arena. This might include legislative prohibitions on redundancy as a resilience mechanism. It might also see if their are self-defeating clashes between the visions for safety and growth. The team might also consider the use of stakeholder risk communications to help action-ably assess any residual risk that might not be infeasible or un-affordable to address.
To paraphrase Harry Shearer, "The Corps showed me the Lake Borne works and I said they're certainly big. Now it's time to bring in smarter engineers."
Off soap box, KC
I keep having to remind myself that in New Orleans we are considered to have a levee which means that resilience (or lack there of) isn't even considered. Levees are viewed as a binary condition - there or not there. The factor considered for flood plain risk determination is actually rain inside the levees. Makes it easy to calculate but doesn't communicate the real risk. Besides, de-certifying levees is a political quagmire once more pitting growth against safety.
Background:
Katrina devastated homes, business and lives to a historic and unprecedented (black swan) extent
Corps evaluation team (finds) that flood works were a system in name only and recommends future be approached as comprehensive systems
Corp implements a 12 action effort headed by a systems approach
12 actions turns into a campaign plan which expunges the word and intent of a systems approach
Recovery actions by Corps follow same old fragmentation by project funding with no visible integration efforts. Also appear to omit stakeholder focus and life cycle risk management
Corps adopts Adaptive Management practices from ecology community to achieve the effect of comprehensive systems - safety and resilience are not central. Corps (and state) claim they follow all system practices with no validation and evidence
Recommendations
Other distinguished organizations continue to advocate a national commission such as was used for 9/11. It hasn't happened and probably won't and certainly won't get combined with Deepwater Horizon spill although both were (probably) caused by systems in name only conditions.
I suggest demanding the Corps perform an in flight, world class peer review to asses if the the solution emerging from the Corps' recovery work, is a system in more than just name. The peer review should confirm the correctness of and adherence to the IPET's assessment and the result 12 action for change created by the Corps. The peer review would report both its findings and recommendations for doing the right thing the right way.
The peer review team should include the views from proven water safety programs such as Holland and Germany. The review team should also include relevant disciplines include systems engineering and resilience engineering rather than just narrowly focused civil engineers and hydrologists. The review team should also include members of key stakeholder classes such as residents as well as local, state and federal preparedness, response and recovery.
The scope of the peer review should address a total water safety perspective including the full range of non-structural measures
Adaptive Management includes some best practices such as experimentation but I see as omitting some of the key best practices to insure that the deliver results are and remain a resilient system. Ecosystem-oriented methods don't have an adequate focus on the criticality of human life.
The literature on resilient systems is adequate to establish a baseline "checklist" to begin assessing safety-critial systems capabillity. The peer review team would be expected to make significant contributions to sustaining more resilient public infrastructure.
The peer review might be expected to find and address some serious clashes between science and politics in the water safety arena. This might include legislative prohibitions on redundancy as a resilience mechanism. It might also see if their are self-defeating clashes between the visions for safety and growth. The team might also consider the use of stakeholder risk communications to help action-ably assess any residual risk that might not be infeasible or un-affordable to address.
To paraphrase Harry Shearer, "The Corps showed me the Lake Borne works and I said they're certainly big. Now it's time to bring in smarter engineers."
Off soap box, KC
I keep having to remind myself that in New Orleans we are considered to have a levee which means that resilience (or lack there of) isn't even considered. Levees are viewed as a binary condition - there or not there. The factor considered for flood plain risk determination is actually rain inside the levees. Makes it easy to calculate but doesn't communicate the real risk. Besides, de-certifying levees is a political quagmire once more pitting growth against safety.
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
Re: A Moment to Ask: Will This Protect New Orleans?
Re: A Moment to Ask: Will This Protect New Orleans? by John Schwartz
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/a-moment-to-ask-is-this-the-right-way/
One of the fundamendal root causes of the Katrina catastrophe is that there is striking clash between the way the American Society of Civil Engineers requires its members to regard safety as paramount and the way the Corps and Congress work. If this way of working, which puts safety after growth, budget and politics, continues into the future, Americans must stop thinking about the Corps as the nation's civil engineers and think of them as un-professional tradesmen who pour cement and move dirt.
There are several hallmarks of a true, comprehensive system that were absent when the pre-Katrina flood works were assessed to be a \"system in name only\"
True systems are defined and bounded by a particular set of risks experienced by a population or other results of value. Calling a group of civil works a "risk reduction system" is an oxymoron for a true system. The systems engineer's system needs to deliver basic results such as "protect us (the population) from catastrophic disturbance triggered by storm surge".
A true system would manage all the risks (all category hurricanes and storms) and all the potential mitigation (structural, non-structural and preparation)measures. Niether the Corps nor and other public sector player has committed to step up to a comprehenive systems view and solution. New Orleanians and other populations at risk will continue to have to make life-criticfal decisions without receiving actionable risk information from anyone.
Evacuations may save lives but, as we've seen, do nothing for property or economic viability (jobs, homes, culture, etc.)
The best place to start is with a world class peer review to answer the question: "Is the flood protection for greater New Orleans going to be more that just a system in name only and, if the answer is no, what needs to done to attain an adequate level of system protection?"
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/a-moment-to-ask-is-this-the-right-way/
One of the fundamendal root causes of the Katrina catastrophe is that there is striking clash between the way the American Society of Civil Engineers requires its members to regard safety as paramount and the way the Corps and Congress work. If this way of working, which puts safety after growth, budget and politics, continues into the future, Americans must stop thinking about the Corps as the nation's civil engineers and think of them as un-professional tradesmen who pour cement and move dirt.
There are several hallmarks of a true, comprehensive system that were absent when the pre-Katrina flood works were assessed to be a \"system in name only\"
True systems are defined and bounded by a particular set of risks experienced by a population or other results of value. Calling a group of civil works a "risk reduction system" is an oxymoron for a true system. The systems engineer's system needs to deliver basic results such as "protect us (the population) from catastrophic disturbance triggered by storm surge".
A true system would manage all the risks (all category hurricanes and storms) and all the potential mitigation (structural, non-structural and preparation)measures. Niether the Corps nor and other public sector player has committed to step up to a comprehenive systems view and solution. New Orleanians and other populations at risk will continue to have to make life-criticfal decisions without receiving actionable risk information from anyone.
Evacuations may save lives but, as we've seen, do nothing for property or economic viability (jobs, homes, culture, etc.)
The best place to start is with a world class peer review to answer the question: "Is the flood protection for greater New Orleans going to be more that just a system in name only and, if the answer is no, what needs to done to attain an adequate level of system protection?"
Thursday, August 19, 2010
Re: Ready to forgive, but never to forget: A guest column by Michael Homanl Homan
Ready to forgive, but never to forget: A guest column by Michael Homanl Homan
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/ready_to_forgive_but_never_to.html
I was struck dumb by Michael's aspiration that "subsequent levee failures are a distant memory" coupled with the notion of forgivness. Until the perpetrators (and there were many) commit themselves to prevent future failures by applying the lessons learned from past failures, I, personally, can find no room for forgiveness.
As laura5490 so aptly put it, The Corps and its masters and co-conspirators in Congress and the Executive branch have explicitly rejecting the findings and recommendations of the IPET. The finding was that pre-Katrina flood protection works were a system in name only. The recommendation was to treat future efforts with a comprehensive systems approach. The Dutch added the imperative of putting safety first. NONE of these recommendations have been adopted and, in fact, they have been purposefully been rejected and discarded.
I'm sorry to take such an un-Chistian posture but foregivness will only come with a concrete, science-based commitments and actions to ensure that there are no more "subsequent levee failures." Today, the Corps employs bad science and failed practices and expects us to believe that our risks are reduced to an acceptable level. They haven't learned
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/ready_to_forgive_but_never_to.html
I was struck dumb by Michael's aspiration that "subsequent levee failures are a distant memory" coupled with the notion of forgivness. Until the perpetrators (and there were many) commit themselves to prevent future failures by applying the lessons learned from past failures, I, personally, can find no room for forgiveness.
As laura5490 so aptly put it, The Corps and its masters and co-conspirators in Congress and the Executive branch have explicitly rejecting the findings and recommendations of the IPET. The finding was that pre-Katrina flood protection works were a system in name only. The recommendation was to treat future efforts with a comprehensive systems approach. The Dutch added the imperative of putting safety first. NONE of these recommendations have been adopted and, in fact, they have been purposefully been rejected and discarded.
I'm sorry to take such an un-Chistian posture but foregivness will only come with a concrete, science-based commitments and actions to ensure that there are no more "subsequent levee failures." Today, the Corps employs bad science and failed practices and expects us to believe that our risks are reduced to an acceptable level. They haven't learned
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
RE: New Orleans rebuilding and resilient, Brookings Institution reports: An editorial
Posted by kcking
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
In response to New Orleans rebuilding and resilient, Brookings Institution reports: An editorial http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/post_103.html
Posted by kcking
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
It is sad that such distinguished institutions as Brookings and our local heros, the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center would overlook the most critical challenges facing us from Katrina - we neither learned nor applied lessons on how to prepare for the next big one.
Burried in the Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce's (IPET) executive summary were the finding that the pre-Katrina flood protection works were a "system in name only" and that future flood protection efforts be undertanken with a "comprehensive systems approach." To that, the Dutch recommended we put safety first. Neither of these have happen and in fact they have been explicitly rejected by our leadership at all levels in favor of economic growth.
The state and city are activily oposing safe rebuilding. The state operated a historically incompetent recovery program. The Corps of Engineers and the LA Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority have purposefully expunged the notion of a true systems approach from their policy and actions.
Untill we put safety first and follow proven world-class comprehensive systems practices, our lives, our property and our viability will continue to be at grave and unknown risk. It will require unprecedent skill and courage to effectively prepare ourselfs for the next one. I hope the Times-Picayune, the Brookings Institute and the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center does what it takes to make us safer.
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
In response to New Orleans rebuilding and resilient, Brookings Institution reports: An editorial http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/post_103.html
Posted by kcking
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
It is sad that such distinguished institutions as Brookings and our local heros, the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center would overlook the most critical challenges facing us from Katrina - we neither learned nor applied lessons on how to prepare for the next big one.
Burried in the Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce's (IPET) executive summary were the finding that the pre-Katrina flood protection works were a "system in name only" and that future flood protection efforts be undertanken with a "comprehensive systems approach." To that, the Dutch recommended we put safety first. Neither of these have happen and in fact they have been explicitly rejected by our leadership at all levels in favor of economic growth.
The state and city are activily oposing safe rebuilding. The state operated a historically incompetent recovery program. The Corps of Engineers and the LA Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority have purposefully expunged the notion of a true systems approach from their policy and actions.
Untill we put safety first and follow proven world-class comprehensive systems practices, our lives, our property and our viability will continue to be at grave and unknown risk. It will require unprecedent skill and courage to effectively prepare ourselfs for the next one. I hope the Times-Picayune, the Brookings Institute and the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center does what it takes to make us safer.
Friday, August 6, 2010
Mr Jackson, [Commisioner SE LA Flood Protection Authority] in respo0onse to T-P article
Excuse me for taking the liberty to communicate directly. As a Katrina survivor and retired Boeing Systems Engineer, I have followed the aftermath of Katrina with deep personal and professional curiosity and interest. Thank you for your comments quoted by Ms Grissett in the 8/14 Times-Picayune in which you observed that "their [the Corps'] guidelines still treat individual projects instead of as part of a system." I, along with the IPET report, believe the absence for sound, proven systems engineering practices was a root cause of catastrophic man-made consequences of Katrina
With the latest fragmentation of independent peer reviews scoped to selected projects rather than to systems as a whole I, see the Corps as explicitly repudiating the formidable work and courage of the IPET which held that the Flood Protection System was a "system in name only." The IPET went on to recommend that future flood protection solutions be crafted, operated and maintained as systems over their life cycle.
As you may or may not be aware, independent peer reviews are a critical element in achieving world class systems engineering outcomes as endorse by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). Chief among these mission-critical outcomes is integrity and resilience neither of which characterd our pre-Katrina flood prevention mechanisms and will not characterize the Corps' current efforts. Integrity, like safety, doesn't just happen. At Boeing, systems engineering generally accounted for 15% of the budget of safety-critical program (air frames, etc.)
I am delighted to see you take such an active part in advance the use of systems concepts and practices in flood protection efforts. For more information on this I would invite your attention to the emerging practice of resilience systems engineering which is explicitly focused on the low probability/high consequence risks that characterized the Katina experience and now, the Deepwater Horizon event. I am an active member on INCOSE Resilient Systems Working Group and The Infrastrure Security Partnership (TISP) which is also sponsoring the development of guides to achieving resilience. Collectively these groups are moving forward to realize the Dutch vision of "safety first through a systems approach"
Our wetlands are an integral part of our flood protection "system." Somebody needs the mission to integrate our understanding of their changed capacity into the total risks faced by flood stakeholders. It appears that neither the Corps or the state's CPRA have stepped up.
If there is anything I can do to assist you in your efforts to promote a systems approach please feel free to call on me because my family's safety depends on the right solution.
Respectfully, K.C. King
5919 Pratt Drive, NOLA 70122
(504) 232-6110
Excuse me for taking the liberty to communicate directly. As a Katrina survivor and retired Boeing Systems Engineer, I have followed the aftermath of Katrina with deep personal and professional curiosity and interest. Thank you for your comments quoted by Ms Grissett in the 8/14 Times-Picayune in which you observed that "their [the Corps'] guidelines still treat individual projects instead of as part of a system." I, along with the IPET report, believe the absence for sound, proven systems engineering practices was a root cause of catastrophic man-made consequences of Katrina
With the latest fragmentation of independent peer reviews scoped to selected projects rather than to systems as a whole I, see the Corps as explicitly repudiating the formidable work and courage of the IPET which held that the Flood Protection System was a "system in name only." The IPET went on to recommend that future flood protection solutions be crafted, operated and maintained as systems over their life cycle.
As you may or may not be aware, independent peer reviews are a critical element in achieving world class systems engineering outcomes as endorse by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). Chief among these mission-critical outcomes is integrity and resilience neither of which characterd our pre-Katrina flood prevention mechanisms and will not characterize the Corps' current efforts. Integrity, like safety, doesn't just happen. At Boeing, systems engineering generally accounted for 15% of the budget of safety-critical program (air frames, etc.)
I am delighted to see you take such an active part in advance the use of systems concepts and practices in flood protection efforts. For more information on this I would invite your attention to the emerging practice of resilience systems engineering which is explicitly focused on the low probability/high consequence risks that characterized the Katina experience and now, the Deepwater Horizon event. I am an active member on INCOSE Resilient Systems Working Group and The Infrastrure Security Partnership (TISP) which is also sponsoring the development of guides to achieving resilience. Collectively these groups are moving forward to realize the Dutch vision of "safety first through a systems approach"
Our wetlands are an integral part of our flood protection "system." Somebody needs the mission to integrate our understanding of their changed capacity into the total risks faced by flood stakeholders. It appears that neither the Corps or the state's CPRA have stepped up.
If there is anything I can do to assist you in your efforts to promote a systems approach please feel free to call on me because my family's safety depends on the right solution.
Respectfully, K.C. King
5919 Pratt Drive, NOLA 70122
(504) 232-6110
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