Some follow-on thoughts on advancing resilience engineering to solve problems such as flood-induced catastrophes
Background:
Katrina devastated homes, business and lives to a historic and unprecedented (black swan) extent
Corps evaluation team (finds) that flood works were a system in name only and recommends future be approached as comprehensive systems
Corp implements a 12 action effort headed by a systems approach
12 actions turns into a campaign plan which expunges the word and intent of a systems approach
Recovery actions by Corps follow same old fragmentation by project funding with no visible integration efforts. Also appear to omit stakeholder focus and life cycle risk management
Corps adopts Adaptive Management practices from ecology community to achieve the effect of comprehensive systems - safety and resilience are not central. Corps (and state) claim they follow all system practices with no validation and evidence
Recommendations
Other distinguished organizations continue to advocate a national commission such as was used for 9/11. It hasn't happened and probably won't and certainly won't get combined with Deepwater Horizon spill although both were (probably) caused by systems in name only conditions.
I suggest demanding the Corps perform an in flight, world class peer review to asses if the the solution emerging from the Corps' recovery work, is a system in more than just name. The peer review should confirm the correctness of and adherence to the IPET's assessment and the result 12 action for change created by the Corps. The peer review would report both its findings and recommendations for doing the right thing the right way.
The peer review team should include the views from proven water safety programs such as Holland and Germany. The review team should also include relevant disciplines include systems engineering and resilience engineering rather than just narrowly focused civil engineers and hydrologists. The review team should also include members of key stakeholder classes such as residents as well as local, state and federal preparedness, response and recovery.
The scope of the peer review should address a total water safety perspective including the full range of non-structural measures
Adaptive Management includes some best practices such as experimentation but I see as omitting some of the key best practices to insure that the deliver results are and remain a resilient system. Ecosystem-oriented methods don't have an adequate focus on the criticality of human life.
The literature on resilient systems is adequate to establish a baseline "checklist" to begin assessing safety-critial systems capabillity. The peer review team would be expected to make significant contributions to sustaining more resilient public infrastructure.
The peer review might be expected to find and address some serious clashes between science and politics in the water safety arena. This might include legislative prohibitions on redundancy as a resilience mechanism. It might also see if their are self-defeating clashes between the visions for safety and growth. The team might also consider the use of stakeholder risk communications to help action-ably assess any residual risk that might not be infeasible or un-affordable to address.
To paraphrase Harry Shearer, "The Corps showed me the Lake Borne works and I said they're certainly big. Now it's time to bring in smarter engineers."
Off soap box, KC
I keep having to remind myself that in New Orleans we are considered to have a levee which means that resilience (or lack there of) isn't even considered. Levees are viewed as a binary condition - there or not there. The factor considered for flood plain risk determination is actually rain inside the levees. Makes it easy to calculate but doesn't communicate the real risk. Besides, de-certifying levees is a political quagmire once more pitting growth against safety.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
Re: A Moment to Ask: Will This Protect New Orleans?
Re: A Moment to Ask: Will This Protect New Orleans? by John Schwartz
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/a-moment-to-ask-is-this-the-right-way/
One of the fundamendal root causes of the Katrina catastrophe is that there is striking clash between the way the American Society of Civil Engineers requires its members to regard safety as paramount and the way the Corps and Congress work. If this way of working, which puts safety after growth, budget and politics, continues into the future, Americans must stop thinking about the Corps as the nation's civil engineers and think of them as un-professional tradesmen who pour cement and move dirt.
There are several hallmarks of a true, comprehensive system that were absent when the pre-Katrina flood works were assessed to be a \"system in name only\"
True systems are defined and bounded by a particular set of risks experienced by a population or other results of value. Calling a group of civil works a "risk reduction system" is an oxymoron for a true system. The systems engineer's system needs to deliver basic results such as "protect us (the population) from catastrophic disturbance triggered by storm surge".
A true system would manage all the risks (all category hurricanes and storms) and all the potential mitigation (structural, non-structural and preparation)measures. Niether the Corps nor and other public sector player has committed to step up to a comprehenive systems view and solution. New Orleanians and other populations at risk will continue to have to make life-criticfal decisions without receiving actionable risk information from anyone.
Evacuations may save lives but, as we've seen, do nothing for property or economic viability (jobs, homes, culture, etc.)
The best place to start is with a world class peer review to answer the question: "Is the flood protection for greater New Orleans going to be more that just a system in name only and, if the answer is no, what needs to done to attain an adequate level of system protection?"
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/a-moment-to-ask-is-this-the-right-way/
One of the fundamendal root causes of the Katrina catastrophe is that there is striking clash between the way the American Society of Civil Engineers requires its members to regard safety as paramount and the way the Corps and Congress work. If this way of working, which puts safety after growth, budget and politics, continues into the future, Americans must stop thinking about the Corps as the nation's civil engineers and think of them as un-professional tradesmen who pour cement and move dirt.
There are several hallmarks of a true, comprehensive system that were absent when the pre-Katrina flood works were assessed to be a \"system in name only\"
True systems are defined and bounded by a particular set of risks experienced by a population or other results of value. Calling a group of civil works a "risk reduction system" is an oxymoron for a true system. The systems engineer's system needs to deliver basic results such as "protect us (the population) from catastrophic disturbance triggered by storm surge".
A true system would manage all the risks (all category hurricanes and storms) and all the potential mitigation (structural, non-structural and preparation)measures. Niether the Corps nor and other public sector player has committed to step up to a comprehenive systems view and solution. New Orleanians and other populations at risk will continue to have to make life-criticfal decisions without receiving actionable risk information from anyone.
Evacuations may save lives but, as we've seen, do nothing for property or economic viability (jobs, homes, culture, etc.)
The best place to start is with a world class peer review to answer the question: "Is the flood protection for greater New Orleans going to be more that just a system in name only and, if the answer is no, what needs to done to attain an adequate level of system protection?"
Thursday, August 19, 2010
Re: Ready to forgive, but never to forget: A guest column by Michael Homanl Homan
Ready to forgive, but never to forget: A guest column by Michael Homanl Homan
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/ready_to_forgive_but_never_to.html
I was struck dumb by Michael's aspiration that "subsequent levee failures are a distant memory" coupled with the notion of forgivness. Until the perpetrators (and there were many) commit themselves to prevent future failures by applying the lessons learned from past failures, I, personally, can find no room for forgiveness.
As laura5490 so aptly put it, The Corps and its masters and co-conspirators in Congress and the Executive branch have explicitly rejecting the findings and recommendations of the IPET. The finding was that pre-Katrina flood protection works were a system in name only. The recommendation was to treat future efforts with a comprehensive systems approach. The Dutch added the imperative of putting safety first. NONE of these recommendations have been adopted and, in fact, they have been purposefully been rejected and discarded.
I'm sorry to take such an un-Chistian posture but foregivness will only come with a concrete, science-based commitments and actions to ensure that there are no more "subsequent levee failures." Today, the Corps employs bad science and failed practices and expects us to believe that our risks are reduced to an acceptable level. They haven't learned
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/ready_to_forgive_but_never_to.html
I was struck dumb by Michael's aspiration that "subsequent levee failures are a distant memory" coupled with the notion of forgivness. Until the perpetrators (and there were many) commit themselves to prevent future failures by applying the lessons learned from past failures, I, personally, can find no room for forgiveness.
As laura5490 so aptly put it, The Corps and its masters and co-conspirators in Congress and the Executive branch have explicitly rejecting the findings and recommendations of the IPET. The finding was that pre-Katrina flood protection works were a system in name only. The recommendation was to treat future efforts with a comprehensive systems approach. The Dutch added the imperative of putting safety first. NONE of these recommendations have been adopted and, in fact, they have been purposefully been rejected and discarded.
I'm sorry to take such an un-Chistian posture but foregivness will only come with a concrete, science-based commitments and actions to ensure that there are no more "subsequent levee failures." Today, the Corps employs bad science and failed practices and expects us to believe that our risks are reduced to an acceptable level. They haven't learned
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
RE: New Orleans rebuilding and resilient, Brookings Institution reports: An editorial
Posted by kcking
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
In response to New Orleans rebuilding and resilient, Brookings Institution reports: An editorial http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/post_103.html
Posted by kcking
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
It is sad that such distinguished institutions as Brookings and our local heros, the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center would overlook the most critical challenges facing us from Katrina - we neither learned nor applied lessons on how to prepare for the next big one.
Burried in the Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce's (IPET) executive summary were the finding that the pre-Katrina flood protection works were a "system in name only" and that future flood protection efforts be undertanken with a "comprehensive systems approach." To that, the Dutch recommended we put safety first. Neither of these have happen and in fact they have been explicitly rejected by our leadership at all levels in favor of economic growth.
The state and city are activily oposing safe rebuilding. The state operated a historically incompetent recovery program. The Corps of Engineers and the LA Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority have purposefully expunged the notion of a true systems approach from their policy and actions.
Untill we put safety first and follow proven world-class comprehensive systems practices, our lives, our property and our viability will continue to be at grave and unknown risk. It will require unprecedent skill and courage to effectively prepare ourselfs for the next one. I hope the Times-Picayune, the Brookings Institute and the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center does what it takes to make us safer.
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
In response to New Orleans rebuilding and resilient, Brookings Institution reports: An editorial http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/post_103.html
Posted by kcking
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
It is sad that such distinguished institutions as Brookings and our local heros, the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center would overlook the most critical challenges facing us from Katrina - we neither learned nor applied lessons on how to prepare for the next big one.
Burried in the Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce's (IPET) executive summary were the finding that the pre-Katrina flood protection works were a "system in name only" and that future flood protection efforts be undertanken with a "comprehensive systems approach." To that, the Dutch recommended we put safety first. Neither of these have happen and in fact they have been explicitly rejected by our leadership at all levels in favor of economic growth.
The state and city are activily oposing safe rebuilding. The state operated a historically incompetent recovery program. The Corps of Engineers and the LA Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority have purposefully expunged the notion of a true systems approach from their policy and actions.
Untill we put safety first and follow proven world-class comprehensive systems practices, our lives, our property and our viability will continue to be at grave and unknown risk. It will require unprecedent skill and courage to effectively prepare ourselfs for the next one. I hope the Times-Picayune, the Brookings Institute and the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center does what it takes to make us safer.
Friday, August 6, 2010
Mr Jackson, [Commisioner SE LA Flood Protection Authority] in respo0onse to T-P article
Excuse me for taking the liberty to communicate directly. As a Katrina survivor and retired Boeing Systems Engineer, I have followed the aftermath of Katrina with deep personal and professional curiosity and interest. Thank you for your comments quoted by Ms Grissett in the 8/14 Times-Picayune in which you observed that "their [the Corps'] guidelines still treat individual projects instead of as part of a system." I, along with the IPET report, believe the absence for sound, proven systems engineering practices was a root cause of catastrophic man-made consequences of Katrina
With the latest fragmentation of independent peer reviews scoped to selected projects rather than to systems as a whole I, see the Corps as explicitly repudiating the formidable work and courage of the IPET which held that the Flood Protection System was a "system in name only." The IPET went on to recommend that future flood protection solutions be crafted, operated and maintained as systems over their life cycle.
As you may or may not be aware, independent peer reviews are a critical element in achieving world class systems engineering outcomes as endorse by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). Chief among these mission-critical outcomes is integrity and resilience neither of which characterd our pre-Katrina flood prevention mechanisms and will not characterize the Corps' current efforts. Integrity, like safety, doesn't just happen. At Boeing, systems engineering generally accounted for 15% of the budget of safety-critical program (air frames, etc.)
I am delighted to see you take such an active part in advance the use of systems concepts and practices in flood protection efforts. For more information on this I would invite your attention to the emerging practice of resilience systems engineering which is explicitly focused on the low probability/high consequence risks that characterized the Katina experience and now, the Deepwater Horizon event. I am an active member on INCOSE Resilient Systems Working Group and The Infrastrure Security Partnership (TISP) which is also sponsoring the development of guides to achieving resilience. Collectively these groups are moving forward to realize the Dutch vision of "safety first through a systems approach"
Our wetlands are an integral part of our flood protection "system." Somebody needs the mission to integrate our understanding of their changed capacity into the total risks faced by flood stakeholders. It appears that neither the Corps or the state's CPRA have stepped up.
If there is anything I can do to assist you in your efforts to promote a systems approach please feel free to call on me because my family's safety depends on the right solution.
Respectfully, K.C. King
5919 Pratt Drive, NOLA 70122
(504) 232-6110
Excuse me for taking the liberty to communicate directly. As a Katrina survivor and retired Boeing Systems Engineer, I have followed the aftermath of Katrina with deep personal and professional curiosity and interest. Thank you for your comments quoted by Ms Grissett in the 8/14 Times-Picayune in which you observed that "their [the Corps'] guidelines still treat individual projects instead of as part of a system." I, along with the IPET report, believe the absence for sound, proven systems engineering practices was a root cause of catastrophic man-made consequences of Katrina
With the latest fragmentation of independent peer reviews scoped to selected projects rather than to systems as a whole I, see the Corps as explicitly repudiating the formidable work and courage of the IPET which held that the Flood Protection System was a "system in name only." The IPET went on to recommend that future flood protection solutions be crafted, operated and maintained as systems over their life cycle.
As you may or may not be aware, independent peer reviews are a critical element in achieving world class systems engineering outcomes as endorse by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). Chief among these mission-critical outcomes is integrity and resilience neither of which characterd our pre-Katrina flood prevention mechanisms and will not characterize the Corps' current efforts. Integrity, like safety, doesn't just happen. At Boeing, systems engineering generally accounted for 15% of the budget of safety-critical program (air frames, etc.)
I am delighted to see you take such an active part in advance the use of systems concepts and practices in flood protection efforts. For more information on this I would invite your attention to the emerging practice of resilience systems engineering which is explicitly focused on the low probability/high consequence risks that characterized the Katina experience and now, the Deepwater Horizon event. I am an active member on INCOSE Resilient Systems Working Group and The Infrastrure Security Partnership (TISP) which is also sponsoring the development of guides to achieving resilience. Collectively these groups are moving forward to realize the Dutch vision of "safety first through a systems approach"
Our wetlands are an integral part of our flood protection "system." Somebody needs the mission to integrate our understanding of their changed capacity into the total risks faced by flood stakeholders. It appears that neither the Corps or the state's CPRA have stepped up.
If there is anything I can do to assist you in your efforts to promote a systems approach please feel free to call on me because my family's safety depends on the right solution.
Respectfully, K.C. King
5919 Pratt Drive, NOLA 70122
(504) 232-6110
Monday, August 2, 2010
Comment on:Probe on how drilling moratorium was decided is welcome: An editorial
Re: Times-Picayune Editorial entitaled robe on how drilling moratorium was decided is welcome: An editorial August 2, 2010
The Times-Picayune editorial staff is again displaying its profound ignorance of good science and engineering by continuing to endorse the hip-shot conclusions of Dr. Bea's narrowly "targeted" recommended measures for ensuring that its safe to drill. Implementing all of these fixes as discrete, unintegrated projects will not render deep water drilling adequately safer that it was before the blowout.
According to the scientists' communication with Louisiana politicians on the 7th of June they concluded that "The tradgedy had very specific causes." That finding assures us that there was no systemic problem with a complex chain of, as they call it, "improbable" evens. Isn't that what the Corps of Engineers initially concluded about Katrina?
What the scientists and drilling advocates need to do is to look at the lessons learned from Katrina. The Corps' Interagency Performance Evaluation Team (IPET) concluded after several years (not months) that the Hurricane Protection Systems around New Orleans was a "system in name only" and for it to be safe it would have to become a comprehensive, fully integrated, system. Recent research in systems engineering indicates that it is highly unlikely that a system will be resilient unless it is a well-formed system and low frequency, high consequence risks like blow outs and levee failure are further enhanced with aditional systematic resilience measures to protect populations and their protective ecology.
As far as I can determined, the scientists have not yet asked the question "Was the deepwater horizon a system in more than just name?" From my perspective, I will continue to assess my flood risks as significantly higher than they were as a result of damaged caused healthy wind and storm surge-defeating wetlands.
I wish some one would help me quantify that risk.
The Times-Picayune editorial staff is again displaying its profound ignorance of good science and engineering by continuing to endorse the hip-shot conclusions of Dr. Bea's narrowly "targeted" recommended measures for ensuring that its safe to drill. Implementing all of these fixes as discrete, unintegrated projects will not render deep water drilling adequately safer that it was before the blowout.
According to the scientists' communication with Louisiana politicians on the 7th of June they concluded that "The tradgedy had very specific causes." That finding assures us that there was no systemic problem with a complex chain of, as they call it, "improbable" evens. Isn't that what the Corps of Engineers initially concluded about Katrina?
What the scientists and drilling advocates need to do is to look at the lessons learned from Katrina. The Corps' Interagency Performance Evaluation Team (IPET) concluded after several years (not months) that the Hurricane Protection Systems around New Orleans was a "system in name only" and for it to be safe it would have to become a comprehensive, fully integrated, system. Recent research in systems engineering indicates that it is highly unlikely that a system will be resilient unless it is a well-formed system and low frequency, high consequence risks like blow outs and levee failure are further enhanced with aditional systematic resilience measures to protect populations and their protective ecology.
As far as I can determined, the scientists have not yet asked the question "Was the deepwater horizon a system in more than just name?" From my perspective, I will continue to assess my flood risks as significantly higher than they were as a result of damaged caused healthy wind and storm surge-defeating wetlands.
I wish some one would help me quantify that risk.
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