Response to Flood protection system on track, on budget: A letter to the editor from Karen Durham-Aguilera, P.E.
Senior Executive Service, Director
Task Force Hope
Mississippi Valley Division
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/09/flood_protection_system_on_tra.html
Posted September 23, 2010, 1:05AM
As a Professional Engineer committed to holding safety paramount, Ms Durham-Aguilera should feel embarrassed to stoop to snake oil hucksterism when she asserts that New Orleans has the "best perimeter defense in its history." What New Orleans deserves is an adequate flood protection system.
Ms Durham-Aguilera is 100% correct when she cites the IPET's findings that Katrina taught us that flood risk reduction can only be accomplished as a system. Unfortunately, the Corps is still mired in fragmented projects, non-existent systems engineering practices, dysfunctional relations with local and state partners and an utter lack of effective, actionable communications with resident stakeholders about their residual risks.
The Corps is not expected to own these levees forever but is expected to provide the leadership to forge responsible local life cycle operation and maintenance. There are many institutions (none of them in Louisiana) that can help the Corps with proven practices to envision, define, architect, engineer and build integrated, resilient systems that deliver adequate safety to our residents against storms and hurricanes.
Without a midcourse correction, the findings and recommendations of the distinguished IPET report will go unheeded and unmet.
Its ironic to note that the Editors add Flood Protection System to the title when the Corps only refers to a risk reduction system. There's a huge difference.
Thursday, September 23, 2010
Thursday, September 16, 2010
Re: Don't stall on ending drilling moratorium: An editorial
In response to a Times-Picayune editorial on 16 September 2010
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/09/dont_stall_on_ending_drilling.html
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The deep water drilling moratorium was and continues to be a prudent policy that puts safety before growth. The rationale is that we don't know what happened and we don't know what responsible measures to take to prevent it from happening again. We need to wait until we see good science and engineering solutions to making offshore drilling as resilient as it needs to be.
Recent articles by your reporter David Hammer, which cite the continued lack of a safety culture have highlighted the profound uncertainty surrounding a conservative, well-engineered solution. Remember what should be the creed of all engineers - err on the side of safety when there are significant safety and uncertainty issues.
Although I have the profoundest respect for Dr Bea and his study team, I believe his recommendations of primarily fixing specific hardware problems is much to narrow and is the prevailing wisdom of today's petroleum engineers. The right line of inquiry should follow the Corp's IPET findings that pre-Katrina works were a system "in name only" and their recommendation that these works must become a true, comprehensive, integrated, holistic and resilient system in order to guard against inevitable future threats.
I firmly believe that if BP and its subs were put to the system-in-more-than-just-name test, conducted by people who have engineered proven resilient systems, they would be found wanting. Until we get the right people asking the right safety-critical questions we should continue to limit drilling in those conditions where there are no uncertainties.
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/09/dont_stall_on_ending_drilling.html
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The deep water drilling moratorium was and continues to be a prudent policy that puts safety before growth. The rationale is that we don't know what happened and we don't know what responsible measures to take to prevent it from happening again. We need to wait until we see good science and engineering solutions to making offshore drilling as resilient as it needs to be.
Recent articles by your reporter David Hammer, which cite the continued lack of a safety culture have highlighted the profound uncertainty surrounding a conservative, well-engineered solution. Remember what should be the creed of all engineers - err on the side of safety when there are significant safety and uncertainty issues.
Although I have the profoundest respect for Dr Bea and his study team, I believe his recommendations of primarily fixing specific hardware problems is much to narrow and is the prevailing wisdom of today's petroleum engineers. The right line of inquiry should follow the Corp's IPET findings that pre-Katrina works were a system "in name only" and their recommendation that these works must become a true, comprehensive, integrated, holistic and resilient system in order to guard against inevitable future threats.
I firmly believe that if BP and its subs were put to the system-in-more-than-just-name test, conducted by people who have engineered proven resilient systems, they would be found wanting. Until we get the right people asking the right safety-critical questions we should continue to limit drilling in those conditions where there are no uncertainties.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
The Way Forward for a Systems Approach
Some follow-on thoughts on advancing resilience engineering to solve problems such as flood-induced catastrophes
Background:
Katrina devastated homes, business and lives to a historic and unprecedented (black swan) extent
Corps evaluation team (finds) that flood works were a system in name only and recommends future be approached as comprehensive systems
Corp implements a 12 action effort headed by a systems approach
12 actions turns into a campaign plan which expunges the word and intent of a systems approach
Recovery actions by Corps follow same old fragmentation by project funding with no visible integration efforts. Also appear to omit stakeholder focus and life cycle risk management
Corps adopts Adaptive Management practices from ecology community to achieve the effect of comprehensive systems - safety and resilience are not central. Corps (and state) claim they follow all system practices with no validation and evidence
Recommendations
Other distinguished organizations continue to advocate a national commission such as was used for 9/11. It hasn't happened and probably won't and certainly won't get combined with Deepwater Horizon spill although both were (probably) caused by systems in name only conditions.
I suggest demanding the Corps perform an in flight, world class peer review to asses if the the solution emerging from the Corps' recovery work, is a system in more than just name. The peer review should confirm the correctness of and adherence to the IPET's assessment and the result 12 action for change created by the Corps. The peer review would report both its findings and recommendations for doing the right thing the right way.
The peer review team should include the views from proven water safety programs such as Holland and Germany. The review team should also include relevant disciplines include systems engineering and resilience engineering rather than just narrowly focused civil engineers and hydrologists. The review team should also include members of key stakeholder classes such as residents as well as local, state and federal preparedness, response and recovery.
The scope of the peer review should address a total water safety perspective including the full range of non-structural measures
Adaptive Management includes some best practices such as experimentation but I see as omitting some of the key best practices to insure that the deliver results are and remain a resilient system. Ecosystem-oriented methods don't have an adequate focus on the criticality of human life.
The literature on resilient systems is adequate to establish a baseline "checklist" to begin assessing safety-critial systems capabillity. The peer review team would be expected to make significant contributions to sustaining more resilient public infrastructure.
The peer review might be expected to find and address some serious clashes between science and politics in the water safety arena. This might include legislative prohibitions on redundancy as a resilience mechanism. It might also see if their are self-defeating clashes between the visions for safety and growth. The team might also consider the use of stakeholder risk communications to help action-ably assess any residual risk that might not be infeasible or un-affordable to address.
To paraphrase Harry Shearer, "The Corps showed me the Lake Borne works and I said they're certainly big. Now it's time to bring in smarter engineers."
Off soap box, KC
I keep having to remind myself that in New Orleans we are considered to have a levee which means that resilience (or lack there of) isn't even considered. Levees are viewed as a binary condition - there or not there. The factor considered for flood plain risk determination is actually rain inside the levees. Makes it easy to calculate but doesn't communicate the real risk. Besides, de-certifying levees is a political quagmire once more pitting growth against safety.
Background:
Katrina devastated homes, business and lives to a historic and unprecedented (black swan) extent
Corps evaluation team (finds) that flood works were a system in name only and recommends future be approached as comprehensive systems
Corp implements a 12 action effort headed by a systems approach
12 actions turns into a campaign plan which expunges the word and intent of a systems approach
Recovery actions by Corps follow same old fragmentation by project funding with no visible integration efforts. Also appear to omit stakeholder focus and life cycle risk management
Corps adopts Adaptive Management practices from ecology community to achieve the effect of comprehensive systems - safety and resilience are not central. Corps (and state) claim they follow all system practices with no validation and evidence
Recommendations
Other distinguished organizations continue to advocate a national commission such as was used for 9/11. It hasn't happened and probably won't and certainly won't get combined with Deepwater Horizon spill although both were (probably) caused by systems in name only conditions.
I suggest demanding the Corps perform an in flight, world class peer review to asses if the the solution emerging from the Corps' recovery work, is a system in more than just name. The peer review should confirm the correctness of and adherence to the IPET's assessment and the result 12 action for change created by the Corps. The peer review would report both its findings and recommendations for doing the right thing the right way.
The peer review team should include the views from proven water safety programs such as Holland and Germany. The review team should also include relevant disciplines include systems engineering and resilience engineering rather than just narrowly focused civil engineers and hydrologists. The review team should also include members of key stakeholder classes such as residents as well as local, state and federal preparedness, response and recovery.
The scope of the peer review should address a total water safety perspective including the full range of non-structural measures
Adaptive Management includes some best practices such as experimentation but I see as omitting some of the key best practices to insure that the deliver results are and remain a resilient system. Ecosystem-oriented methods don't have an adequate focus on the criticality of human life.
The literature on resilient systems is adequate to establish a baseline "checklist" to begin assessing safety-critial systems capabillity. The peer review team would be expected to make significant contributions to sustaining more resilient public infrastructure.
The peer review might be expected to find and address some serious clashes between science and politics in the water safety arena. This might include legislative prohibitions on redundancy as a resilience mechanism. It might also see if their are self-defeating clashes between the visions for safety and growth. The team might also consider the use of stakeholder risk communications to help action-ably assess any residual risk that might not be infeasible or un-affordable to address.
To paraphrase Harry Shearer, "The Corps showed me the Lake Borne works and I said they're certainly big. Now it's time to bring in smarter engineers."
Off soap box, KC
I keep having to remind myself that in New Orleans we are considered to have a levee which means that resilience (or lack there of) isn't even considered. Levees are viewed as a binary condition - there or not there. The factor considered for flood plain risk determination is actually rain inside the levees. Makes it easy to calculate but doesn't communicate the real risk. Besides, de-certifying levees is a political quagmire once more pitting growth against safety.
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
Re: A Moment to Ask: Will This Protect New Orleans?
Re: A Moment to Ask: Will This Protect New Orleans? by John Schwartz
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/a-moment-to-ask-is-this-the-right-way/
One of the fundamendal root causes of the Katrina catastrophe is that there is striking clash between the way the American Society of Civil Engineers requires its members to regard safety as paramount and the way the Corps and Congress work. If this way of working, which puts safety after growth, budget and politics, continues into the future, Americans must stop thinking about the Corps as the nation's civil engineers and think of them as un-professional tradesmen who pour cement and move dirt.
There are several hallmarks of a true, comprehensive system that were absent when the pre-Katrina flood works were assessed to be a \"system in name only\"
True systems are defined and bounded by a particular set of risks experienced by a population or other results of value. Calling a group of civil works a "risk reduction system" is an oxymoron for a true system. The systems engineer's system needs to deliver basic results such as "protect us (the population) from catastrophic disturbance triggered by storm surge".
A true system would manage all the risks (all category hurricanes and storms) and all the potential mitigation (structural, non-structural and preparation)measures. Niether the Corps nor and other public sector player has committed to step up to a comprehenive systems view and solution. New Orleanians and other populations at risk will continue to have to make life-criticfal decisions without receiving actionable risk information from anyone.
Evacuations may save lives but, as we've seen, do nothing for property or economic viability (jobs, homes, culture, etc.)
The best place to start is with a world class peer review to answer the question: "Is the flood protection for greater New Orleans going to be more that just a system in name only and, if the answer is no, what needs to done to attain an adequate level of system protection?"
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/a-moment-to-ask-is-this-the-right-way/
One of the fundamendal root causes of the Katrina catastrophe is that there is striking clash between the way the American Society of Civil Engineers requires its members to regard safety as paramount and the way the Corps and Congress work. If this way of working, which puts safety after growth, budget and politics, continues into the future, Americans must stop thinking about the Corps as the nation's civil engineers and think of them as un-professional tradesmen who pour cement and move dirt.
There are several hallmarks of a true, comprehensive system that were absent when the pre-Katrina flood works were assessed to be a \"system in name only\"
True systems are defined and bounded by a particular set of risks experienced by a population or other results of value. Calling a group of civil works a "risk reduction system" is an oxymoron for a true system. The systems engineer's system needs to deliver basic results such as "protect us (the population) from catastrophic disturbance triggered by storm surge".
A true system would manage all the risks (all category hurricanes and storms) and all the potential mitigation (structural, non-structural and preparation)measures. Niether the Corps nor and other public sector player has committed to step up to a comprehenive systems view and solution. New Orleanians and other populations at risk will continue to have to make life-criticfal decisions without receiving actionable risk information from anyone.
Evacuations may save lives but, as we've seen, do nothing for property or economic viability (jobs, homes, culture, etc.)
The best place to start is with a world class peer review to answer the question: "Is the flood protection for greater New Orleans going to be more that just a system in name only and, if the answer is no, what needs to done to attain an adequate level of system protection?"
Thursday, August 19, 2010
Re: Ready to forgive, but never to forget: A guest column by Michael Homanl Homan
Ready to forgive, but never to forget: A guest column by Michael Homanl Homan
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/ready_to_forgive_but_never_to.html
I was struck dumb by Michael's aspiration that "subsequent levee failures are a distant memory" coupled with the notion of forgivness. Until the perpetrators (and there were many) commit themselves to prevent future failures by applying the lessons learned from past failures, I, personally, can find no room for forgiveness.
As laura5490 so aptly put it, The Corps and its masters and co-conspirators in Congress and the Executive branch have explicitly rejecting the findings and recommendations of the IPET. The finding was that pre-Katrina flood protection works were a system in name only. The recommendation was to treat future efforts with a comprehensive systems approach. The Dutch added the imperative of putting safety first. NONE of these recommendations have been adopted and, in fact, they have been purposefully been rejected and discarded.
I'm sorry to take such an un-Chistian posture but foregivness will only come with a concrete, science-based commitments and actions to ensure that there are no more "subsequent levee failures." Today, the Corps employs bad science and failed practices and expects us to believe that our risks are reduced to an acceptable level. They haven't learned
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/ready_to_forgive_but_never_to.html
I was struck dumb by Michael's aspiration that "subsequent levee failures are a distant memory" coupled with the notion of forgivness. Until the perpetrators (and there were many) commit themselves to prevent future failures by applying the lessons learned from past failures, I, personally, can find no room for forgiveness.
As laura5490 so aptly put it, The Corps and its masters and co-conspirators in Congress and the Executive branch have explicitly rejecting the findings and recommendations of the IPET. The finding was that pre-Katrina flood protection works were a system in name only. The recommendation was to treat future efforts with a comprehensive systems approach. The Dutch added the imperative of putting safety first. NONE of these recommendations have been adopted and, in fact, they have been purposefully been rejected and discarded.
I'm sorry to take such an un-Chistian posture but foregivness will only come with a concrete, science-based commitments and actions to ensure that there are no more "subsequent levee failures." Today, the Corps employs bad science and failed practices and expects us to believe that our risks are reduced to an acceptable level. They haven't learned
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
RE: New Orleans rebuilding and resilient, Brookings Institution reports: An editorial
Posted by kcking
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
In response to New Orleans rebuilding and resilient, Brookings Institution reports: An editorial http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/post_103.html
Posted by kcking
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
It is sad that such distinguished institutions as Brookings and our local heros, the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center would overlook the most critical challenges facing us from Katrina - we neither learned nor applied lessons on how to prepare for the next big one.
Burried in the Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce's (IPET) executive summary were the finding that the pre-Katrina flood protection works were a "system in name only" and that future flood protection efforts be undertanken with a "comprehensive systems approach." To that, the Dutch recommended we put safety first. Neither of these have happen and in fact they have been explicitly rejected by our leadership at all levels in favor of economic growth.
The state and city are activily oposing safe rebuilding. The state operated a historically incompetent recovery program. The Corps of Engineers and the LA Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority have purposefully expunged the notion of a true systems approach from their policy and actions.
Untill we put safety first and follow proven world-class comprehensive systems practices, our lives, our property and our viability will continue to be at grave and unknown risk. It will require unprecedent skill and courage to effectively prepare ourselfs for the next one. I hope the Times-Picayune, the Brookings Institute and the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center does what it takes to make us safer.
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
In response to New Orleans rebuilding and resilient, Brookings Institution reports: An editorial http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/post_103.html
Posted by kcking
August 17, 2010, 11:10AM
It is sad that such distinguished institutions as Brookings and our local heros, the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center would overlook the most critical challenges facing us from Katrina - we neither learned nor applied lessons on how to prepare for the next big one.
Burried in the Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce's (IPET) executive summary were the finding that the pre-Katrina flood protection works were a "system in name only" and that future flood protection efforts be undertanken with a "comprehensive systems approach." To that, the Dutch recommended we put safety first. Neither of these have happen and in fact they have been explicitly rejected by our leadership at all levels in favor of economic growth.
The state and city are activily oposing safe rebuilding. The state operated a historically incompetent recovery program. The Corps of Engineers and the LA Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority have purposefully expunged the notion of a true systems approach from their policy and actions.
Untill we put safety first and follow proven world-class comprehensive systems practices, our lives, our property and our viability will continue to be at grave and unknown risk. It will require unprecedent skill and courage to effectively prepare ourselfs for the next one. I hope the Times-Picayune, the Brookings Institute and the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center does what it takes to make us safer.
Friday, August 6, 2010
Mr Jackson, [Commisioner SE LA Flood Protection Authority] in respo0onse to T-P article
Excuse me for taking the liberty to communicate directly. As a Katrina survivor and retired Boeing Systems Engineer, I have followed the aftermath of Katrina with deep personal and professional curiosity and interest. Thank you for your comments quoted by Ms Grissett in the 8/14 Times-Picayune in which you observed that "their [the Corps'] guidelines still treat individual projects instead of as part of a system." I, along with the IPET report, believe the absence for sound, proven systems engineering practices was a root cause of catastrophic man-made consequences of Katrina
With the latest fragmentation of independent peer reviews scoped to selected projects rather than to systems as a whole I, see the Corps as explicitly repudiating the formidable work and courage of the IPET which held that the Flood Protection System was a "system in name only." The IPET went on to recommend that future flood protection solutions be crafted, operated and maintained as systems over their life cycle.
As you may or may not be aware, independent peer reviews are a critical element in achieving world class systems engineering outcomes as endorse by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). Chief among these mission-critical outcomes is integrity and resilience neither of which characterd our pre-Katrina flood prevention mechanisms and will not characterize the Corps' current efforts. Integrity, like safety, doesn't just happen. At Boeing, systems engineering generally accounted for 15% of the budget of safety-critical program (air frames, etc.)
I am delighted to see you take such an active part in advance the use of systems concepts and practices in flood protection efforts. For more information on this I would invite your attention to the emerging practice of resilience systems engineering which is explicitly focused on the low probability/high consequence risks that characterized the Katina experience and now, the Deepwater Horizon event. I am an active member on INCOSE Resilient Systems Working Group and The Infrastrure Security Partnership (TISP) which is also sponsoring the development of guides to achieving resilience. Collectively these groups are moving forward to realize the Dutch vision of "safety first through a systems approach"
Our wetlands are an integral part of our flood protection "system." Somebody needs the mission to integrate our understanding of their changed capacity into the total risks faced by flood stakeholders. It appears that neither the Corps or the state's CPRA have stepped up.
If there is anything I can do to assist you in your efforts to promote a systems approach please feel free to call on me because my family's safety depends on the right solution.
Respectfully, K.C. King
5919 Pratt Drive, NOLA 70122
(504) 232-6110
Excuse me for taking the liberty to communicate directly. As a Katrina survivor and retired Boeing Systems Engineer, I have followed the aftermath of Katrina with deep personal and professional curiosity and interest. Thank you for your comments quoted by Ms Grissett in the 8/14 Times-Picayune in which you observed that "their [the Corps'] guidelines still treat individual projects instead of as part of a system." I, along with the IPET report, believe the absence for sound, proven systems engineering practices was a root cause of catastrophic man-made consequences of Katrina
With the latest fragmentation of independent peer reviews scoped to selected projects rather than to systems as a whole I, see the Corps as explicitly repudiating the formidable work and courage of the IPET which held that the Flood Protection System was a "system in name only." The IPET went on to recommend that future flood protection solutions be crafted, operated and maintained as systems over their life cycle.
As you may or may not be aware, independent peer reviews are a critical element in achieving world class systems engineering outcomes as endorse by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). Chief among these mission-critical outcomes is integrity and resilience neither of which characterd our pre-Katrina flood prevention mechanisms and will not characterize the Corps' current efforts. Integrity, like safety, doesn't just happen. At Boeing, systems engineering generally accounted for 15% of the budget of safety-critical program (air frames, etc.)
I am delighted to see you take such an active part in advance the use of systems concepts and practices in flood protection efforts. For more information on this I would invite your attention to the emerging practice of resilience systems engineering which is explicitly focused on the low probability/high consequence risks that characterized the Katina experience and now, the Deepwater Horizon event. I am an active member on INCOSE Resilient Systems Working Group and The Infrastrure Security Partnership (TISP) which is also sponsoring the development of guides to achieving resilience. Collectively these groups are moving forward to realize the Dutch vision of "safety first through a systems approach"
Our wetlands are an integral part of our flood protection "system." Somebody needs the mission to integrate our understanding of their changed capacity into the total risks faced by flood stakeholders. It appears that neither the Corps or the state's CPRA have stepped up.
If there is anything I can do to assist you in your efforts to promote a systems approach please feel free to call on me because my family's safety depends on the right solution.
Respectfully, K.C. King
5919 Pratt Drive, NOLA 70122
(504) 232-6110
Monday, August 2, 2010
Comment on:Probe on how drilling moratorium was decided is welcome: An editorial
Re: Times-Picayune Editorial entitaled robe on how drilling moratorium was decided is welcome: An editorial August 2, 2010
The Times-Picayune editorial staff is again displaying its profound ignorance of good science and engineering by continuing to endorse the hip-shot conclusions of Dr. Bea's narrowly "targeted" recommended measures for ensuring that its safe to drill. Implementing all of these fixes as discrete, unintegrated projects will not render deep water drilling adequately safer that it was before the blowout.
According to the scientists' communication with Louisiana politicians on the 7th of June they concluded that "The tradgedy had very specific causes." That finding assures us that there was no systemic problem with a complex chain of, as they call it, "improbable" evens. Isn't that what the Corps of Engineers initially concluded about Katrina?
What the scientists and drilling advocates need to do is to look at the lessons learned from Katrina. The Corps' Interagency Performance Evaluation Team (IPET) concluded after several years (not months) that the Hurricane Protection Systems around New Orleans was a "system in name only" and for it to be safe it would have to become a comprehensive, fully integrated, system. Recent research in systems engineering indicates that it is highly unlikely that a system will be resilient unless it is a well-formed system and low frequency, high consequence risks like blow outs and levee failure are further enhanced with aditional systematic resilience measures to protect populations and their protective ecology.
As far as I can determined, the scientists have not yet asked the question "Was the deepwater horizon a system in more than just name?" From my perspective, I will continue to assess my flood risks as significantly higher than they were as a result of damaged caused healthy wind and storm surge-defeating wetlands.
I wish some one would help me quantify that risk.
The Times-Picayune editorial staff is again displaying its profound ignorance of good science and engineering by continuing to endorse the hip-shot conclusions of Dr. Bea's narrowly "targeted" recommended measures for ensuring that its safe to drill. Implementing all of these fixes as discrete, unintegrated projects will not render deep water drilling adequately safer that it was before the blowout.
According to the scientists' communication with Louisiana politicians on the 7th of June they concluded that "The tradgedy had very specific causes." That finding assures us that there was no systemic problem with a complex chain of, as they call it, "improbable" evens. Isn't that what the Corps of Engineers initially concluded about Katrina?
What the scientists and drilling advocates need to do is to look at the lessons learned from Katrina. The Corps' Interagency Performance Evaluation Team (IPET) concluded after several years (not months) that the Hurricane Protection Systems around New Orleans was a "system in name only" and for it to be safe it would have to become a comprehensive, fully integrated, system. Recent research in systems engineering indicates that it is highly unlikely that a system will be resilient unless it is a well-formed system and low frequency, high consequence risks like blow outs and levee failure are further enhanced with aditional systematic resilience measures to protect populations and their protective ecology.
As far as I can determined, the scientists have not yet asked the question "Was the deepwater horizon a system in more than just name?" From my perspective, I will continue to assess my flood risks as significantly higher than they were as a result of damaged caused healthy wind and storm surge-defeating wetlands.
I wish some one would help me quantify that risk.
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Comment on: Scientists point to better way to safer drilling: An editorial
I have the profoundest respect and admiration for Bob Bea but I'm afraid he and his team have missed the major root cause and the proven solution.
The Corps' IPET took several years to figure out that the root cause of the Katrina failures was that our flood protection system was a "system in name only" and that to ensure the future safety of all the flood protection stakeholders, the flood protection systems (in name only) had to turn it into a real system with high integrity and resilience. Unfortunately those lessons have been rejected by the Corps, the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority and our local levee boards who explicitly refuse to use a systems engineering approach
Dr Bea's team has given us a laundry list of specific actions some of which have some very imprecise measures of success such as sufficient, comprehensive, and effective. They suggest fixing the specific defects in operators safety cultures in the short term. That shows a poor understanding of how difficult and time-consuming it is to change a culture that lionizes risk takers to one that puts safety first.
But the bigest fault of the team is its failure to identify or promote a total systems approach as the most important and essential ingredient in creating even a modestly resilient off-shore drilling technology and its supporting life-cycle culture. Recent research into the discipline of resilience systems engineering has established that, in the face of low frequency-high consequence risks, resilience can never be achieve without a fully integrated systems solution driven by a deep understanding of the risks that confront all stakeholders. This includes the interests of residents of New Orleans who have seen the barriers to high winds and storm surges substantially (but unquantifiably) diminished by the spill.
Will BP establish a Road Home Program when our polluted wetlands are inevitably unable to protect ourselves and our homes?
I firmly support Bea's long term recommendation, enhanced with best systems engineering practices such as systems architecting, interface management, stakeholder focus, to name a few, as a minimally acceptable state to permit continued high risk offshore drilling.
Posted on Scientists point to better way to safer drilling: An editorial on July 31, 2010, 2:57PM
The Corps' IPET took several years to figure out that the root cause of the Katrina failures was that our flood protection system was a "system in name only" and that to ensure the future safety of all the flood protection stakeholders, the flood protection systems (in name only) had to turn it into a real system with high integrity and resilience. Unfortunately those lessons have been rejected by the Corps, the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority and our local levee boards who explicitly refuse to use a systems engineering approach
Dr Bea's team has given us a laundry list of specific actions some of which have some very imprecise measures of success such as sufficient, comprehensive, and effective. They suggest fixing the specific defects in operators safety cultures in the short term. That shows a poor understanding of how difficult and time-consuming it is to change a culture that lionizes risk takers to one that puts safety first.
But the bigest fault of the team is its failure to identify or promote a total systems approach as the most important and essential ingredient in creating even a modestly resilient off-shore drilling technology and its supporting life-cycle culture. Recent research into the discipline of resilience systems engineering has established that, in the face of low frequency-high consequence risks, resilience can never be achieve without a fully integrated systems solution driven by a deep understanding of the risks that confront all stakeholders. This includes the interests of residents of New Orleans who have seen the barriers to high winds and storm surges substantially (but unquantifiably) diminished by the spill.
Will BP establish a Road Home Program when our polluted wetlands are inevitably unable to protect ourselves and our homes?
I firmly support Bea's long term recommendation, enhanced with best systems engineering practices such as systems architecting, interface management, stakeholder focus, to name a few, as a minimally acceptable state to permit continued high risk offshore drilling.
Posted on Scientists point to better way to safer drilling: An editorial on July 31, 2010, 2:57PM
Comment on: Robert Dudley, incoming CEO of BP, sees long road ahead
We now know that the moratorium will last considerably longer because BP's leadership still thinks in terms accidents not science or best practices.
The accidents Dudley is talking about are low consequence slips and falls rather than the high consequences of multiple deaths along with economic, environmental and cultural devastation that accompanies major blow-outs and spills in our waters. What he and government stewards should be saying is that so long as there is a remote chance of an high consequence devestation, he will NOT drill.
If BP had any sense, they would be following the Dutch flood water strategy of putting safety first and using a systems approach which is the only repeatable way of protecting against these kinds of risks. I would suspect that were anyone to examine the BP design and operation from a systems perspective, they, like the Corps of Engineers after Katrina, would find that BP's deepwater operations were a "system in name only"
There is an emerging subdiscipline within systems engineering called resilience systems engineering that has examined the Columbia shuttle disaster and Katrina, among othes, and found that you can actually design, build and operate a systems with resilience at a level comensurate with the actual risk and consequences of hurricanes- and oil drilling-induced catastrophes.
So long as BP and others believe that accidents "just happen" and the tooth fairy, it will be unsafe to drill in deep water. It's time to start transforming the way corporations and citizens think. That's a whole lot harder than buying a few tools.
Posted on Robert Dudley, incoming CEO of BP, sees long road ahead on July 28, 2010, 9:37AM
The accidents Dudley is talking about are low consequence slips and falls rather than the high consequences of multiple deaths along with economic, environmental and cultural devastation that accompanies major blow-outs and spills in our waters. What he and government stewards should be saying is that so long as there is a remote chance of an high consequence devestation, he will NOT drill.
If BP had any sense, they would be following the Dutch flood water strategy of putting safety first and using a systems approach which is the only repeatable way of protecting against these kinds of risks. I would suspect that were anyone to examine the BP design and operation from a systems perspective, they, like the Corps of Engineers after Katrina, would find that BP's deepwater operations were a "system in name only"
There is an emerging subdiscipline within systems engineering called resilience systems engineering that has examined the Columbia shuttle disaster and Katrina, among othes, and found that you can actually design, build and operate a systems with resilience at a level comensurate with the actual risk and consequences of hurricanes- and oil drilling-induced catastrophes.
So long as BP and others believe that accidents "just happen" and the tooth fairy, it will be unsafe to drill in deep water. It's time to start transforming the way corporations and citizens think. That's a whole lot harder than buying a few tools.
Posted on Robert Dudley, incoming CEO of BP, sees long road ahead on July 28, 2010, 9:37AM
Comment on: Spill doesn't justify broad moratorium: A letter to the editor
The NASA equivilent I submitted was the Columbia shuttle disaster and not the Challenger O rings. The point I was trying to make was that the Columbia investigation concluded that NASA's culture was a equally as responsible for the diaster as any technical fators.
I see that Bob Bea's second report found the same problem - a culture that didn't promote the safety of workers or the Gulf. A bigger problem was that the MMS and Coast Guard were not able to tell the difference between a safe and an unsafe culture. I suspect it will take a significant amout of time to be able to detect unsafe cultures and even more time to transform the unsafe actors to safe actors. My experience in the systems engineering world is that such cultural transformations take years and don't always succeed.
The choice is clear - safety or jobs. It is clear which one the author has chosen.
Posted on Spill doesn't justify broad moratorium: A letter to the editor on July 26, 2010, 12:16PM
I see that Bob Bea's second report found the same problem - a culture that didn't promote the safety of workers or the Gulf. A bigger problem was that the MMS and Coast Guard were not able to tell the difference between a safe and an unsafe culture. I suspect it will take a significant amout of time to be able to detect unsafe cultures and even more time to transform the unsafe actors to safe actors. My experience in the systems engineering world is that such cultural transformations take years and don't always succeed.
The choice is clear - safety or jobs. It is clear which one the author has chosen.
Posted on Spill doesn't justify broad moratorium: A letter to the editor on July 26, 2010, 12:16PM
Comment on: Sen. Mary Landrieu complains of mixed messages on role of presidential oil spill commission
When Mary said "This was a rogue incident", she confirmed that she'll do anything to bolster oil company profits - and that's very sad.
Is "rougue" a term of science or art? Was Katrina a rougue never to be repeated? Was the Columbia space shuttle a rougue accident.
When it comes to distubances that can happen, however infrequently, and that may present grave (high consequence) risks to life and property, the engineering motto is to be conservative and not take risks. The rule should be "put safety first ahead of growth or profits."
When it comes to man-made intervention in nature, the rule should be "Don't do it if you don't fully understand it." Niether BP nor its regulatory minders understood the conditions under which an untrolled blowout could occur. The moratorium needs to remain in place untill everyone has a shared understanding of these risks.
A quicker answer would be to require that the insurance industry cover these risks with acuarially realistic premiums and not allow self-insurance where high consequences are possible. I believe such a solution would allow the market to drive high risk drilling out of the Gulf.
Mary, lets use science and engineering to meeting our challenges rather that wild animal behavior patterns.
Posted on Sen. Mary Landrieu complains of mixed messages on role of presidential oil spill commission on July 13, 2010, 2:33PM
Is "rougue" a term of science or art? Was Katrina a rougue never to be repeated? Was the Columbia space shuttle a rougue accident.
When it comes to distubances that can happen, however infrequently, and that may present grave (high consequence) risks to life and property, the engineering motto is to be conservative and not take risks. The rule should be "put safety first ahead of growth or profits."
When it comes to man-made intervention in nature, the rule should be "Don't do it if you don't fully understand it." Niether BP nor its regulatory minders understood the conditions under which an untrolled blowout could occur. The moratorium needs to remain in place untill everyone has a shared understanding of these risks.
A quicker answer would be to require that the insurance industry cover these risks with acuarially realistic premiums and not allow self-insurance where high consequences are possible. I believe such a solution would allow the market to drive high risk drilling out of the Gulf.
Mary, lets use science and engineering to meeting our challenges rather that wild animal behavior patterns.
Posted on Sen. Mary Landrieu complains of mixed messages on role of presidential oil spill commission on July 13, 2010, 2:33PM
Comment on: News comment: Wish we had a commission after Hurricane Katrina
Another reason we needed (and still) need a national bipartisan commission is that had we had a timely and sound analysis we would have perhaps prevented the Deepwater Horizon event because both it and Katrina had the same rood causes. Safety was not put first and neither followed a systems approach.
These same two strategy elements were suggested by the Dutch and by the IPET's final report. Both elements have been explicitly rejected by the Corps, every level of local and state government. Before we can begin to solve the root problems we have to promote the right values (safety over growth) and a total systems view of the problem and the solution.
It's not surprising that Louisinan has no higher level program in systems engineering and that risk management, central to systems engineering and Bob Bea's recommentations, in the oil business is left to businessmen's guts and to not engineers.
This is a much knotier problem than just reforming the Corps or tightening up some flood gates. It has to reach down to include how residents decide where to live and how to build.
Posted on News comment: Wish we had a commission after Hurricane Katrina on July 13, 2010, 11:38AM
These same two strategy elements were suggested by the Dutch and by the IPET's final report. Both elements have been explicitly rejected by the Corps, every level of local and state government. Before we can begin to solve the root problems we have to promote the right values (safety over growth) and a total systems view of the problem and the solution.
It's not surprising that Louisinan has no higher level program in systems engineering and that risk management, central to systems engineering and Bob Bea's recommentations, in the oil business is left to businessmen's guts and to not engineers.
This is a much knotier problem than just reforming the Corps or tightening up some flood gates. It has to reach down to include how residents decide where to live and how to build.
Posted on News comment: Wish we had a commission after Hurricane Katrina on July 13, 2010, 11:38AM
Comment on:Court of Appeals should expedite case on drilling moratorium: An editorial
When you talk about requiring oil CEOs to be criminally liable, you are citing reporting in an David Hammer article in the news. David also quotes Lee Hunt, president of the International Association of Drilling Contractors as saying thatthe issue of CEO liability, something that companies are used to when certifying their financial statements, is a bit more difficult.
Hunt goes on to say "It will take some time to ensure the same protocols exists to give oil company CEOs confidence in the specific engineering procedures on rigs"
In my view the use of criminal liability will provide the ultimate protection for out safety. It will motivate companies to do the kind of research that will ensure works (like levees) will have adequately engineered resilience (reliability, safety, readiness, etc).
As David Hammer observed, the moratorium is a moot point with these forms of assurance in place. As far as I'm concered, its in industry's corner to get peer reviews and make serious assurances that bad things won't happen.
Posted on Court of Appeals should expedite case on drilling moratorium: An editorial on July 08, 2010, 2:59PM
Hunt goes on to say "It will take some time to ensure the same protocols exists to give oil company CEOs confidence in the specific engineering procedures on rigs"
In my view the use of criminal liability will provide the ultimate protection for out safety. It will motivate companies to do the kind of research that will ensure works (like levees) will have adequately engineered resilience (reliability, safety, readiness, etc).
As David Hammer observed, the moratorium is a moot point with these forms of assurance in place. As far as I'm concered, its in industry's corner to get peer reviews and make serious assurances that bad things won't happen.
Posted on Court of Appeals should expedite case on drilling moratorium: An editorial on July 08, 2010, 2:59PM
Comment on: Corps delivers overdue Category 5 hurricane protection study to Congress
From what I can gather about the report and the NRC issues is that nobody has read the Corps of Engineers own lessons learned document prepared by it Iteragency Performance Evaluation Team. The teams most stinking acusation was that the flood protect system was "a system in name only". They also ignored the strongest recommendation which is; if they ever build it again they should use a comprehensive systems approach.
The plan appears to offer an array of disjointed projects with out any systems "glue" to ensure that they do it right with real requirements of real stakeholders and the kind of resiliency needed to hold the pieces together.
What I see is a plan to build things and not a plan to protect people and their property.
Posted on Corps delivers overdue Category 5 hurricane protection study to Congress on July 01, 2010, 12:56PM
The plan appears to offer an array of disjointed projects with out any systems "glue" to ensure that they do it right with real requirements of real stakeholders and the kind of resiliency needed to hold the pieces together.
What I see is a plan to build things and not a plan to protect people and their property.
Posted on Corps delivers overdue Category 5 hurricane protection study to Congress on July 01, 2010, 12:56PM
Comment on: The president isn't at fault: A letter to the editor
As I see it, the moratorum needs to remain in place until such time as we know the root causes of this mess and that the instustry has the knowledge and capability to prevent and rapidly (1 day) respond to blow outs and leaks in the funture. In addition the government needs to be able to inspect that this capability is the right one and it works.
Anyone want to take a guess at how long this will take. For my money it won't start until BP replaces its full page adds of committed local claims guys with credible information that will assure the public that it won't happen again. I'm waiting
Posted on The president isn't at fault: A letter to the editor on June 28, 2010, 4:36PM
Anyone want to take a guess at how long this will take. For my money it won't start until BP replaces its full page adds of committed local claims guys with credible information that will assure the public that it won't happen again. I'm waiting
Posted on The president isn't at fault: A letter to the editor on June 28, 2010, 4:36PM
Comment on: Oily words can't hide the sticky truth: Jarvis DeBerry
Now that we have (some) consensus of what went wrong, engineering and inspections, its time to focus on how to fix it.
Systems engineers (remember "system in name only" have a practice, apparently unknown to the wildcating oil and gas industry or MMS, called resilience systems engineering, that deal with risks that are complicated , low frequency and very high (safety) consequences. The heart of resilience systems engineering is, like the Dutch flood protection policy: to put safety first; and use a disciplined, risk-centered systems approach.
Making quick fixes is the more challenging because it will, like NASA in the Columbia disaster, require a radical cultural transformation. Such transformations require a lot of time and some hard rethinking which won't start until the players recognize they need to change.
Look up resilience systems engineering to find out more about the only viable solution to preventing , surviving and recovering from a Katrina or a Deepwater Horizon - http://www.resilience-engineering.org/
Posted on Oily words can't hide the sticky truth: Jarvis DeBerry on June 25, 2010, 11:48AM
Systems engineers (remember "system in name only" have a practice, apparently unknown to the wildcating oil and gas industry or MMS, called resilience systems engineering, that deal with risks that are complicated , low frequency and very high (safety) consequences. The heart of resilience systems engineering is, like the Dutch flood protection policy: to put safety first; and use a disciplined, risk-centered systems approach.
Making quick fixes is the more challenging because it will, like NASA in the Columbia disaster, require a radical cultural transformation. Such transformations require a lot of time and some hard rethinking which won't start until the players recognize they need to change.
Look up resilience systems engineering to find out more about the only viable solution to preventing , surviving and recovering from a Katrina or a Deepwater Horizon - http://www.resilience-engineering.org/
Posted on Oily words can't hide the sticky truth: Jarvis DeBerry on June 25, 2010, 11:48AM
Comment on: BP's Doug Suttles says company 'threw everything' at gushing oil well
Mr. Suttles is confusing quantity with quality. Efficacy is what we need. Their plan was efficacious and niether was the improvisations.
So far, the benefit to the world is in the form of a new case study on how NOT to prevent or respond to oil spills. The continuing crime is denying that anything needs to be learned before we put put lives and property on the line.
And then there's our Govenor. I can't believe that workers didn't know they were putting their lives and the future of the industry at risk by working under unsafe conditions. All of them made a bet and lost. The smart ones should have been looking for better safety conditions or new careers for years. The Governor's proposal to keep workers on the job in high risk conditions is a bailout with the life and property of residents of coastal Louisiana as the poker chips.
From the New Orleans City Council to the LA Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority to the Governor, all local and state politicians will place growth before safety any and every day
Posted on BP's Doug Suttles says company 'threw everything' at gushing oil well on June 25, 2010, 10:06AM
So far, the benefit to the world is in the form of a new case study on how NOT to prevent or respond to oil spills. The continuing crime is denying that anything needs to be learned before we put put lives and property on the line.
And then there's our Govenor. I can't believe that workers didn't know they were putting their lives and the future of the industry at risk by working under unsafe conditions. All of them made a bet and lost. The smart ones should have been looking for better safety conditions or new careers for years. The Governor's proposal to keep workers on the job in high risk conditions is a bailout with the life and property of residents of coastal Louisiana as the poker chips.
From the New Orleans City Council to the LA Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority to the Governor, all local and state politicians will place growth before safety any and every day
Posted on BP's Doug Suttles says company 'threw everything' at gushing oil well on June 25, 2010, 10:06AM
Comment on: Salazar seeks to reimpose drilling moratorium
Not!
Insurance premiums (a non-regulated industry) have gone up more than 50% since the explosion. If anybody figures what operators will have to do to make their response and recovery plans acceptable the cost will be astronomical.
Of course we could lower the liability limits on deep water drillers so that the tax payers would bail them out.
Posted on Salazar seeks to reimpose drilling moratorium on June 23, 2010, 12:12PM
Insurance premiums (a non-regulated industry) have gone up more than 50% since the explosion. If anybody figures what operators will have to do to make their response and recovery plans acceptable the cost will be astronomical.
Of course we could lower the liability limits on deep water drillers so that the tax payers would bail them out.
Posted on Salazar seeks to reimpose drilling moratorium on June 23, 2010, 12:12PM
Comment on: Salazar seeks to reimpose drilling moratorium
What new safety regs? What reports states that anyone knows how to stop a ddep well from exploding or that there won't be any spill? The root cause of the deep water horizon calamity is, like other catastrophe's like Katrina and the Columbia shuttle, as much due to cultural deficiencies throughout the industry. These can't be reduced until the industry, and its regulators, admit that it is broken and comes up with ways to make the essential cultural transformations along with fixing the broken technology and processes.
I see no precedent for that happening in less than 6 months.
What we are "enjoying" now with the threatened collapses of the oil & gas insdustry are the consequences of poor, unethical safety-related engineering practices. There's only one rule that industry and the T-P editorial staff need to be remined of - put safety first. What the judge should have done is require companies to prove that safety of all elements is first. The resoning he did use threatens the lives and properties
Posted on Salazar seeks to reimpose drilling moratorium on June 23, 2010, 11:47AM
I see no precedent for that happening in less than 6 months.
What we are "enjoying" now with the threatened collapses of the oil & gas insdustry are the consequences of poor, unethical safety-related engineering practices. There's only one rule that industry and the T-P editorial staff need to be remined of - put safety first. What the judge should have done is require companies to prove that safety of all elements is first. The resoning he did use threatens the lives and properties
Posted on Salazar seeks to reimpose drilling moratorium on June 23, 2010, 11:47AM
Comment on: Judge issues preliminary injunction blocking federal deepwater drilling moratorium
So we have substituted legal judgement for sound, responsible engineering judgement that says if you don't understand your risks or have credible plans to prevent or instantly mitigate them you should stop until you do.
Civil engineers have a cannon of ethics that requres them to put safety first. I guess petroleum engineers and federal judges don't have this belief
If you want insight go read the 6/21 NY Times article at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/us/21blowout.html You probably won't read it in the T-P.
Posted on Judge issues preliminary injunction blocking federal deepwater drilling moratorium on June 22, 2010, 1:38PM
Civil engineers have a cannon of ethics that requres them to put safety first. I guess petroleum engineers and federal judges don't have this belief
If you want insight go read the 6/21 NY Times article at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/us/21blowout.html You probably won't read it in the T-P.
Posted on Judge issues preliminary injunction blocking federal deepwater drilling moratorium on June 22, 2010, 1:38PM
Comment on: Levee officials to review Corps of Engineers plans for New Orleans canals
The narrow focus on civil engineering works to solve all our flood problems is evident in the report. Will the Corps build a system in more than name only to address the threats to New Orleans residents? It sure doesn't sound like it.
Posted on Levee officials to review Corps of Engineers plans for New Orleans canals on June 22, 2010, 12:29PM
Posted on Levee officials to review Corps of Engineers plans for New Orleans canals on June 22, 2010, 12:29PM
Comment on: Obama administration has drilling moratorium myopia
One of the missing elements in the T-P's consideration is the immorality of continued deep water drilling when no one has a clue how to establish a resilient technology applyed by resilient institutions. Rather touting their ability to play claims, BP should be using it's full page adds in the T-P to tell us how they plan to prevent such a disasterous spill next time.
From another moral perspective, demanding preamature drilling is equivilent to saying that Hitler's death camps were a jobs program whose continuence was justified by the guards' payrolls as well as those that manufactured the gas. If economics trumps morality we are indeed in deep trouble.
The Times-Picayune continues to ignore the undisputable fact that BP was culturally (morally) incapable of putting safety first and that it must go through a major cultural transfomation before its should be trusted with any kind of technology. When that occurs deep Gulf oil with be so costly because companies will have to have real prevention and real response resources in place which none of them do now.
Posted on Obama administration has drilling moratorium myopia: An editorial on June 20, 2010, 2:19PM
From another moral perspective, demanding preamature drilling is equivilent to saying that Hitler's death camps were a jobs program whose continuence was justified by the guards' payrolls as well as those that manufactured the gas. If economics trumps morality we are indeed in deep trouble.
The Times-Picayune continues to ignore the undisputable fact that BP was culturally (morally) incapable of putting safety first and that it must go through a major cultural transfomation before its should be trusted with any kind of technology. When that occurs deep Gulf oil with be so costly because companies will have to have real prevention and real response resources in place which none of them do now.
Posted on Obama administration has drilling moratorium myopia: An editorial on June 20, 2010, 2:19PM
The most critical thing about recovering from a catastrophe is that you must build in things that ensure you won't get whacked again when the next one happens. No one, not the Corps, not the State and not the Parish have done some of the key tasks to fill the gaping hole.
While it is important to note that most homes in flooded areas have not been elevated, a key resilience measure, the thing that is really missing was the one really important finding from the IPET. New Orleans flood protection was a systems IN NAME ONLY. Nothing has been done to creat a real system that integrates all of our flood protection measures and adds the resilence we need to ensure they work together.
What we need is a full, high performance systems approach to protecting our flood plain. As a professional sysems engineer I can tell that I haven't met anyone in this state that understands what a systems approach is. None of our institutions of higher learning teach it let alone award
As the authors of the IPET said, we must use a systems approach if we are to survive. Along with this approach, we need to make one simple change to our cultural values and that's to put safety first before the growth machine, before reelection. If we aren't safe we can;t grow except in an uncertain short (term limited) time frame. Of my native New Orleanian neighbors who didn't or couldn't elevate the unanimous say "If it happens again, I'm out of here
Posted on Louisiana Recovery Authority expects to fold with millions unspent on March 12, 2010, 9:29AM
While it is important to note that most homes in flooded areas have not been elevated, a key resilience measure, the thing that is really missing was the one really important finding from the IPET. New Orleans flood protection was a systems IN NAME ONLY. Nothing has been done to creat a real system that integrates all of our flood protection measures and adds the resilence we need to ensure they work together.
What we need is a full, high performance systems approach to protecting our flood plain. As a professional sysems engineer I can tell that I haven't met anyone in this state that understands what a systems approach is. None of our institutions of higher learning teach it let alone award
As the authors of the IPET said, we must use a systems approach if we are to survive. Along with this approach, we need to make one simple change to our cultural values and that's to put safety first before the growth machine, before reelection. If we aren't safe we can;t grow except in an uncertain short (term limited) time frame. Of my native New Orleanian neighbors who didn't or couldn't elevate the unanimous say "If it happens again, I'm out of here
Posted on Louisiana Recovery Authority expects to fold with millions unspent on March 12, 2010, 9:29AM
Comment on: $100 million in work planned to bolster three New Orleanson canals
Stepping back a bit we have to remember why, according to IPET, the flood protection system failed and that was because it was a system in name only. Well guess what? It's still a system in name only even though its been renamed as a risk reduction system.
IPET went on to say that if its ever built again it should use a "systems approach." That ain't happening! There's no integration with non-structural measures such as elevation or relocation which might be cheaper than drive good piles after bad ones. There's no coordination with grant programs to rebuild or elevate. This fiasco is about steel and concrete and deception rather than about safety and a systems approach.
As long as the Corps and all the other governmental parterns in delusion continue to use 19th century project management as the basis for assuring our safety, we will remain at risk. What we need is what the Dutch do: safety first and a systems approach
Posted on $100 million in work planned to bolster three New Orleanson canals March 02, 2010, 1:19PM
IPET went on to say that if its ever built again it should use a "systems approach." That ain't happening! There's no integration with non-structural measures such as elevation or relocation which might be cheaper than drive good piles after bad ones. There's no coordination with grant programs to rebuild or elevate. This fiasco is about steel and concrete and deception rather than about safety and a systems approach.
As long as the Corps and all the other governmental parterns in delusion continue to use 19th century project management as the basis for assuring our safety, we will remain at risk. What we need is what the Dutch do: safety first and a systems approach
Posted on $100 million in work planned to bolster three New Orleanson canals March 02, 2010, 1:19PM
Comment on: David Vitter files bill to stop updating flood maps
There's only one thing needed for our communities to survive let alone thrive and that's for all governments and residetnts to put safety (protection and defense) first - always. This is what Vitter is NOT doing. Engineers have a rule of thumb backed up by their cannon of ethics which is be conservative when it comes safety. Erring on the side of optimism, as Vitter and his supporters do is bad engineering and is going to get some one killed or washed out of their homes. Being cautious is responsible, prudent and safe. Increasing flood premiums until we know we're safe is the right thing to do.
As I see it, the Corps and all levels of government have done everthing to warrant our distrust and nothing that should improve our trust. Recovery, under Vitter's "leadership" is proceding as if nothing has changed. I feel significantly less secure in my house in NOLA than I did when I thouht that the Corps was the gold standard for professional civil engineering and the government was truely concerned about our common safety
Posted on David Vitter files bill to stop updating flood maps on March 02, 2010, 12:42PM
As I see it, the Corps and all levels of government have done everthing to warrant our distrust and nothing that should improve our trust. Recovery, under Vitter's "leadership" is proceding as if nothing has changed. I feel significantly less secure in my house in NOLA than I did when I thouht that the Corps was the gold standard for professional civil engineering and the government was truely concerned about our common safety
Posted on David Vitter files bill to stop updating flood maps on March 02, 2010, 12:42PM
Comment on: LSU professor Ivor van Heerden sues university, says free speech rights violated in his firing
This is about academic freedom and responsibility. I you can go to an academicly acredited institution of higher learning and buy your view of the objective facts that institution should be immediately discredited and shuned by every professional organization committed to exposing the truth. This is a lose-lose for LSU. Customers buy objective truth rather a beauty context. Otherwise, academe would be just like a business with the credibility of a soap commercial.
My own research along entirely different lines that those used by Ivor indicated that the Corps was not using and has rejected using world class best practices for flood control which are to 1) put safety first and 2) to use a systems approach. As a result the Corps has ignored its own task force begin_of_the_skype_highlighting end_of_the_skype_highlighting whith found the flood protection system to be a system in name only. They have since removed the term or anything pertaining to system from their plans and doctrine and are still, along with the LA Office of Costal Restoration and Protection, following the failed and piecemeal protect planning process
Ivor is following a principled path which has safety critical consequences for those of us who live in threatened flood planes
Posted on LSU professor Ivor van Heerden sues university, says free speech rights violated in his firing on February 10, 2010, 6:07PM on February 10, 2010, 6:07PM
My own research along entirely different lines that those used by Ivor indicated that the Corps was not using and has rejected using world class best practices for flood control which are to 1) put safety first and 2) to use a systems approach. As a result the Corps has ignored its own task force begin_of_the_skype_highlighting end_of_the_skype_highlighting whith found the flood protection system to be a system in name only. They have since removed the term or anything pertaining to system from their plans and doctrine and are still, along with the LA Office of Costal Restoration and Protection, following the failed and piecemeal protect planning process
Ivor is following a principled path which has safety critical consequences for those of us who live in threatened flood planes
Posted on LSU professor Ivor van Heerden sues university, says free speech rights violated in his firing on February 10, 2010, 6:07PM on February 10, 2010, 6:07PM
Coalition pushing issues as New Orleans elections approach: An editorial
No wait! The city and its citizens are 100% responsible for their safety against all threats - particularly the ones we know about. The fact that the Corps has dramatically dropped its engagement and commitment to our safety by renaming what was the flood protections system to the flood risk reduction system is evidence.
At this point no one is in charge and every one looks out for themselves as they see the threat. Groups like Forward New Orleans give the view that Katrina never happened and won't ever again. They appear to view growth as a high priority for the city than safety.
It would help to dispell this view if Forward New Orleans adopted a platform plank that stated a commitment to safety first and called for the new mayor to reverse putting growth before safety. This could be done by prohibiting buldings from being built or renovated below the Katrina high water mark and not use the politically negotiated Base Flood Elevation.
The BFE was unsafe before Katrina and less safe now. The Corps has withdrawn and the state is more concerned about wild life in wetlands than citizen safety.
Posted on Coalition pushing issues as New Orleans elections approach: An editorial on January 11, 2010, 3:09PM
At this point no one is in charge and every one looks out for themselves as they see the threat. Groups like Forward New Orleans give the view that Katrina never happened and won't ever again. They appear to view growth as a high priority for the city than safety.
It would help to dispell this view if Forward New Orleans adopted a platform plank that stated a commitment to safety first and called for the new mayor to reverse putting growth before safety. This could be done by prohibiting buldings from being built or renovated below the Katrina high water mark and not use the politically negotiated Base Flood Elevation.
The BFE was unsafe before Katrina and less safe now. The Corps has withdrawn and the state is more concerned about wild life in wetlands than citizen safety.
Posted on Coalition pushing issues as New Orleans elections approach: An editorial on January 11, 2010, 3:09PM
Comment on: Jarvis DeBerry: Did a corrupt Orleans Levee Board cause flooding? Will a corrupt Corps of Engineers?
Inadequate funding is a choice we and our leadership make, the consequences of this choice are not to just sit here and do nothing but elevate or relocate. Staying put with inadequate protection is both dumb and irresponsible and American taxpayers shouldn't stand for it. Do Louisianaians really want to base their safety on handouts?
It wasn't so much construction and maintenance as design and leadership that sank New Orleans. As the Corp's IPET study concluded. Flood protection was, and remains, a system in name only. The Corps' calling it's new approach a flood "risk reduction" system is an oxymoron. Real systems deal with 100% of the risk and allocate it to solutions with stakeholder (resident) understanding and concurrence.
And it isn't just the Corps. No one, at any level, has stood up and said the problem that must be solved is safety of people and property and I own that problem. The state's latest focus on wetlands recovery shows that safety isn't even on their radar.
If there's one real fault for which the Corps, as an institution of professionakl civil engineers, is squarely to blame is that all these engineers, at all levels have utterly disregarded their prime ethical cannon to hold safety paramount.
If the Corps' professional staff would just remember and act on that creed, New Orleans could once more expect a straight story about affordable safety. Until then it is each resident's obligation to act wisely and responsibly because no one will do it for us.
Posted on Jarvis DeBerry: Did a corrupt Orleans Levee Board cause flooding? Will a corrupt Corps of Engineers? on August 18, 2009, 11:24AM
It wasn't so much construction and maintenance as design and leadership that sank New Orleans. As the Corp's IPET study concluded. Flood protection was, and remains, a system in name only. The Corps' calling it's new approach a flood "risk reduction" system is an oxymoron. Real systems deal with 100% of the risk and allocate it to solutions with stakeholder (resident) understanding and concurrence.
And it isn't just the Corps. No one, at any level, has stood up and said the problem that must be solved is safety of people and property and I own that problem. The state's latest focus on wetlands recovery shows that safety isn't even on their radar.
If there's one real fault for which the Corps, as an institution of professionakl civil engineers, is squarely to blame is that all these engineers, at all levels have utterly disregarded their prime ethical cannon to hold safety paramount.
If the Corps' professional staff would just remember and act on that creed, New Orleans could once more expect a straight story about affordable safety. Until then it is each resident's obligation to act wisely and responsibly because no one will do it for us.
Posted on Jarvis DeBerry: Did a corrupt Orleans Levee Board cause flooding? Will a corrupt Corps of Engineers? on August 18, 2009, 11:24AM
Comment on: Posted on Bob Marshall: LSU ouster of Ivor van Heerden removes most honest appraiser of city's levee failures
Bob Marshall's views on Van Heerden's firing and the sorry state of flood protection in SE Louisiana are right on the money.
Van Heerden should be reinstated with a public appology and commendation for his high ethical standards.
The Times Picayuine should also continue to assess the safety of SE Louisiana as it has aound Katrina but has lapsed in recent times. Even those faults acknolwedged by the Corps' IPET study, such as system-in-name-only, no one's in charge, informed public, and safety criticality, have not been adequately addressed let alone remedied.
The real solution was suggested to us by the Dutch: put safety first and use a systems approach when safety is on the line. Anything less condems us to drown again and again.
Posted on Bob Marshall: LSU ouster of Ivor van Heerden removes most honest appraiser of city's levee failures on April 15, 2009, 9:08AM
Van Heerden should be reinstated with a public appology and commendation for his high ethical standards.
The Times Picayuine should also continue to assess the safety of SE Louisiana as it has aound Katrina but has lapsed in recent times. Even those faults acknolwedged by the Corps' IPET study, such as system-in-name-only, no one's in charge, informed public, and safety criticality, have not been adequately addressed let alone remedied.
The real solution was suggested to us by the Dutch: put safety first and use a systems approach when safety is on the line. Anything less condems us to drown again and again.
Posted on Bob Marshall: LSU ouster of Ivor van Heerden removes most honest appraiser of city's levee failures on April 15, 2009, 9:08AM
Comment on: Gulf Coast recovery chief Janet Woodka discusses plans for office
If Ms Woodka wants to take on real Intractable problems let her try the grand daddy of them all, the one motivated them all -- flood protectio for greater New Orleans. Our protection will need get the city, state and many Federal agencies to work as smart as the Dutch. It will require engineers, adminstrators a total solution that is better than the system in name only that we had, have now and will have if we don'heed the lessons of Katrina.
Charity and other isolated recovery issues will be for naught if we flood again and don't have a real flood system with appropriate structural, non-structural and wetlands subsystems in place
Posted on Gulf Coast recovery chief Janet Woodka discusses plans for office on April 08, 2009,
Charity and other isolated recovery issues will be for naught if we flood again and don't have a real flood system with appropriate structural, non-structural and wetlands subsystems in place
Posted on Gulf Coast recovery chief Janet Woodka discusses plans for office on April 08, 2009,
Comment on: St. Charles council refuses to adopt new flood maps
Here we go again!
Starting with Cameron and now St Charles, one by one our parish governments are chosing the short term economic interests of their residents over their long term safety. This exactly what St. Charles decision to not adopt more scientific digital flood insurance rate maps. In the medium term these decisions will result in another Katrina in terms of unmitigated consequnces.
Although the New Orleans city government is following its consistent line of non-transparency by not informing resident about new risk information, it appears inevitable that they take a position that compromises our safety.
The Times-Picayune appears to be clearly on the side of ignoring risk and supporting the cities anti-elevation position. It is left to individual citizens to speak out of crtical safety issues.
Posted on St. Charles council refuses to adopt new flood maps on January 23, 2009, 8:32AM
Starting with Cameron and now St Charles, one by one our parish governments are chosing the short term economic interests of their residents over their long term safety. This exactly what St. Charles decision to not adopt more scientific digital flood insurance rate maps. In the medium term these decisions will result in another Katrina in terms of unmitigated consequnces.
Although the New Orleans city government is following its consistent line of non-transparency by not informing resident about new risk information, it appears inevitable that they take a position that compromises our safety.
The Times-Picayune appears to be clearly on the side of ignoring risk and supporting the cities anti-elevation position. It is left to individual citizens to speak out of crtical safety issues.
Posted on St. Charles council refuses to adopt new flood maps on January 23, 2009, 8:32AM
Comment on: End the stonewalling: Army Corps of Engineers needs urgency on Category 5 plans on January
The Time-Picayune's call for speed versus quality has three tragic implications: First it shifts the focus away from the quality of the methods the Corps is using, secondly, it promotes individual, potential un-integrated projects that resulted in a "system in name only". And thirdly it assumes that Louisiana "officials" have the near and long term safety of citizens as their highest priority. Neither of these options is in the interest of Louisiana's citizens.
Regarding the Corps methods, the process the Corps adopted for decision making was not only complex it was fatally flawed by modern standards of best requirements engineering practices. Whereas the Corps asked Corps- and self-selected observers to evaluate a total system in terms of Congressional "results of value" such as return on investment and national ecology objectives, they should have identify the "real" stakeholders and asked them to identify THEIR stakes or needed results of value. This wasn't done and needs to be redone.
In it's IPET report, the Corps admitter that one of the root causes of the failure of the flood protection systems was it that was not an integrated system calling it a "system in name only". There is absolutely no evidence that the Corps has taken this to heart and looked for best practices, such as Systems Engineering for an approach to a safety-critical systems. Systems Engineering provides explicit mechanisms for managing risk, interfaces, requirements, and sustainability. None of these practices were in place and few of them have been correctly applied post-Katrina
Finally, Louisiana officials are as responsible for the Katrina failures as the Corps and despite the cosmetic shuffling of levee boards, continue to abrogate their responsibility for total system management Instead we find parish officials returning to form by denying real safety risks in the form of uncertified levees and blocking needs for home elevations.
The Road Home adopted a documented, official policy of speed before quality and wound up taking longer and costing more. Our levees are super-critical to our survival as a state where the quality of our safety protection is so low that national insurance companies will no longer write home owner policies. The Times-Picayune should strongly behind doing things right when it comes to risks to our person and properties.
Posted on End the stonewalling: Army Corps of Engineers needs urgency on Category 5 plans on January 20, 2009, 9:14AM
Regarding the Corps methods, the process the Corps adopted for decision making was not only complex it was fatally flawed by modern standards of best requirements engineering practices. Whereas the Corps asked Corps- and self-selected observers to evaluate a total system in terms of Congressional "results of value" such as return on investment and national ecology objectives, they should have identify the "real" stakeholders and asked them to identify THEIR stakes or needed results of value. This wasn't done and needs to be redone.
In it's IPET report, the Corps admitter that one of the root causes of the failure of the flood protection systems was it that was not an integrated system calling it a "system in name only". There is absolutely no evidence that the Corps has taken this to heart and looked for best practices, such as Systems Engineering for an approach to a safety-critical systems. Systems Engineering provides explicit mechanisms for managing risk, interfaces, requirements, and sustainability. None of these practices were in place and few of them have been correctly applied post-Katrina
Finally, Louisiana officials are as responsible for the Katrina failures as the Corps and despite the cosmetic shuffling of levee boards, continue to abrogate their responsibility for total system management Instead we find parish officials returning to form by denying real safety risks in the form of uncertified levees and blocking needs for home elevations.
The Road Home adopted a documented, official policy of speed before quality and wound up taking longer and costing more. Our levees are super-critical to our survival as a state where the quality of our safety protection is so low that national insurance companies will no longer write home owner policies. The Times-Picayune should strongly behind doing things right when it comes to risks to our person and properties.
Posted on End the stonewalling: Army Corps of Engineers needs urgency on Category 5 plans on January 20, 2009, 9:14AM
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