The NASA equivilent I submitted was the Columbia shuttle disaster and not the Challenger O rings. The point I was trying to make was that the Columbia investigation concluded that NASA's culture was a equally as responsible for the diaster as any technical fators.
I see that Bob Bea's second report found the same problem - a culture that didn't promote the safety of workers or the Gulf. A bigger problem was that the MMS and Coast Guard were not able to tell the difference between a safe and an unsafe culture. I suspect it will take a significant amout of time to be able to detect unsafe cultures and even more time to transform the unsafe actors to safe actors. My experience in the systems engineering world is that such cultural transformations take years and don't always succeed.
The choice is clear - safety or jobs. It is clear which one the author has chosen.
Posted on Spill doesn't justify broad moratorium: A letter to the editor on July 26, 2010, 12:16PM
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